SFOR Transcript June 23, 1997

Transcript: Press Conference Dr. Javier Solana 23 June 1997, 1400 Hours Coalition Press Information Centre Holiday Inn, Sarajevo

(17 Kb) Dr. Javier Solana, NATO Secretary General: Thank you very much for this opportunity to talk to you once again. As you know, it's not the first time we have talked. In this year, I think we have spoken four or five times already. Let me briefly let me go through today's schedule. Today I met once again with the Joint Presidency. I also met with the Co-Chairmen and Vice-Chairman of the Council of Ministers. It was the first time I met here in Sarajevo with the new High Representative, Mr. Carlos Westendorp. I had the opportunity of talking to him in Brussels not long ago and to review with him the evolution here in the theater in Bosnia. But today I wanted to come here and meet with the new High Representative and tell him very clearly from Sarajevo that he will have all the support that SFOR and NATO, in particular, can give him. I have also for the first time-and I would like to underline this-had a meeting with political leaders from opposition parties. This is the first time that I have done that and this I want to underscore, to underline, NATO's support for democratic principles and political pluralism in Bosnia. Let me make a small analysis of how we see things from the SFOR point of view as the operation of SFOR is controlled. Military presiding goes well. But there's still major obstacles remaining in the implementation of the Dayton Peace Agreement. You are aware that we had a very important in Sintra and also you are aware that in Denver this weekend, an important decision and declaration has been made about the implementation of the Dayton Peace Agreement. We have many challenges to face months ahead. Let me mention some in particular that I consider to be the most urgent: The first challenge that they consider urgent is the enforcement of the IPTF's new checkpoint policy. I think this is a basic element in the policy to achieve what was signed in the Dayton Agreement. These would promote freedom of movement throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina. General Crouch has assured me that SFOR will fully back the IPTF in implementing this policy. Any unauthorized checkpoints will be removed without hesitation and I want you to know that, and through you, everybody to know that. The second challenge that I would like to mention, also related to freedom of movement, is the opening of additional airports to civil air traffic. This is a very important measure, not only for what it signifies from the point of view of freedom of movement, but for what it signifies from the point of view of opening this country to the international community via trade, etc. You probably remember that we spoke in January; I told you that I had been pressing the Presidency to sign the Memorandum of Understanding to re-open the three airports in Banja Luka, Tuzla and Mostar to commercial traffic. Unfortunately I have to tell you that they are still not open. They are not open because some politicians seem to be more preoccupied with politics and special interests than with the welfare of their country and their own people. And I have to say that very clearly: There is no reason why these three airports are not open. SFOR is prepared to sign the Memorandum of Understanding. We sent the first draft in April-in April-and still we are in the middle of June and we have not been able to finalize this operation. I want to say again that the responsibility for these lies of the politicians who are more concerned, more preoccupied with little politics than with the benefits that the opening of these three airports may be for their own countrymen. I hope very much that these obstacles can be overcome in the very near future.

(14 Kb) The third challenge relates to the armed forces in Bosnia. SFOR has successfully supervised their separation and demobilization and engaged them in clearing the many minefields that still threaten children of Bosnia. Over time, we need to promote transparency, build confidence between the Entity armies and lay the basis for cooperation, not only within the armed forces in Bosnia, but also between the armed forces and NATO. This objective, I am still concerned that that has not been successful because the establishment of the Presidency's Standing Committee on Military Matters has not been established yet. Let me also tell you that today, in this very moment, this very day, in the NATO School in Germany, it has started a two-week course in international security for 45 Bosnian military and civilian defence officials from both Entities. As long as they continue to demonstrate their commitment to the Standing Committee of Military Affairs and other institutions agreed at Dayton, we will continue organizing these courses regularly from now on. I do hope very much that this course that starts today will be a fruitful one and it will advance things in the direction of a better understanding among all the communities. The fourth challenge I would like to mention to you today is the upcoming municipal elections. These elections, as you know very well, are intended to bring democracy to the level of municipal, the opstina level and to make local officials accountable to the citizens that they serve. As you know, SFOR is heavily involved in the preparations for the elections and as we did with the Presidential Elections, we will ensure that they take place in a secure environment. But as I told the Presidency, free and fair elections will depend on the cooperation of the Bosnian authorities, in particular with the OSCE, with the Organization of Security and Cooperation in Europe. Freedom of press and freedom of movement are crucial, which is why I am taking today to meet with some local media and some political figures outside the current government. As I said the last time I was with you, there are now just under 12 months to go until the end of our mission. As I have said many, many times, these months will pass quickly. The leaders of the Bosnian country must use this time efficiently, productively, to lay the basis for an enduring peace. I don't think they will have a better opportunity than the one they have in front of them now. Thank you very much. I am prepared to take any questions you want to post. Q: Mr. Solana, who is responsible for unsigning that Memorandum of Understanding regarding the opening of airports in Banja Luka, Tuzla and Mostar? And what's your next step towards opening those airports? If one side is hostile to the other or do you have a new initiative in this case? Dr. Javier Solana: Let me very briefly tell you the story of all this: We started talking about this in January and we sent a draft of the Memorandum of Understanding in April. Now we're in the middle of June, and still we have not been able to sign it. As you know, sometimes it happens that we are very close to signing it and suddenly a new problem arises. That is what we want to end, if possible, because we do think-and we honestly think-that we can cooperate on that in a very important measure for the linking of this country to the international community and also to open trade, which after all, will benefit the citizens of the country. I do think that we are close today than ever to signing that Memorandum of Understanding after the meeting with the Presidency this morning and after, with the Council of Ministers. I do hope that we make important steps today. With that, I do not say that we are going to sign today-It's too late. But probably, the steps that we're taking today will move in the right direction. But anyway, I want to make it very clear that it is the responsibility of the political leadership of this country to have these airports open. Q: Which party was against this and refused to sign? What were the reasons for their refusal to sign? Dr. Javier Solana: At this very moment, we are faced with the problem of the airport in Banja Luka. The problem with Banja Luka is an understanding of the-if I may say-of the Memorandum of Understanding that has come out at the very last moment, related to the Banja Luka airport. Q: In your view, is there any contradiction between the Train and Equip Program and the process of stabilization and reconciliation in Bosnia? Dr. Javier Solana: No. I think that although, as you know very well, the Train and Equip program is not a program led by NATO or led by SFOR. It's a program, in which participate some countries. That is not a NATO affair. But the aim of that program, if I understand it properly and I think I do, is to bring a balance from the military point of view. Not to go beyond that. But I want to say again that this is not an operation or a program which is run by NATO. Q: Are you sure that you can control that it will create a balance and not an imbalance at the end? Dr. Javier Solana: I'm sure that it will not go beyond balance. Q: You've been here many times; when you came here during the era of Implementation Force, you were very strict about not discussing anything beyond the one-year mandate and it was as if 1997 didn't exist. Now we're in 1997, we have yet another NATO force here and time is now running out on this mandate-There's only a year left. Could you be more frank about at least what NATO is looking at? You have a summit coming up in Madrid, there was some disagreements in Denver, as you know, about what the U.S. commitment should be. Given the problems in the civilian side of the agreement-you've seen one today with the air traffic-how could you possibly expect that the country would be ready to proceed on its own without a NATO force? No one seems to be arguing that it's possible. Dr. Javier Solana: As you have very clearly said, I was very reluctant to discuss, before the end of IFOR, before SFOR was established, the length of the mandate. I am the Secretary General of NATO and I have a clear mandate by the countries to have SFOR for the duration of the time that you know very well. That's a decision, not of one country-it's a decision of NATO. NATO has decided that SFOR will last until the middle of the month of July, 1988. And that's what I have to defend and I am not prepared to argue what is going to happen after that. The only thing I can say, and I think I am prepared to say that once again, is that the international community will not abandon Bosnia. But of course, within that sentence, a lot of things fit-or may fit-that I once again say that the decision at this point of NATO and the countries that belong to SFOR is to keep the operation going until July 1998. As you know, we're going to go through the process of the (indiscernible) the six first months of SFOR that will be taking place on this coming Thursday and we may draw some other conclusions. But at this point I do not want to get involved in a debate about what may happen after that month of July 1998. Why? Because I think we have a lot to do from now until the end of the year, which would be, more or less, 13 months, July 1998. And I do want that everybody assumes their own responsibilities and I don't want to get involved in a debate that only thing that may lead is that those have the responsibility of implementing the peace agreement, of reconstructing this country, of doing all the mess and reconciliation of this country, take that time to talk instead of to work. To talk instead of to take actions. We are all very tired of words, of statements. These people do have to take their own responsibilities and move negotiations forward. And this, unfortunately, is not taking place at the speed, at the rate, I would like seeing it. Q: How do you feel about the philosophy that many people now hold, that if the NATO troops withdraw as planned in June 1998, that the fighting will restart? And secondly, I'm surprised that you seem to be as comfortable with the train and equip idea as you have given to the previous person who asked that question. Because Carl Bildt, upon leaving last week, expressed his great concerns about the lack of arms control in this country and talked about military expenditure and he said he was very worried about it. Dr. Javier Solana: Well the first question, the answer I have given already. Q: Do you think the fighting will restart? Dr. Javier Solana: No. I do think that we will be able to use the time that is left. And of course, I do not think fighting will start. I would be crazy saying this if I expected that fighting would start. I think we have a year in front of us and we have use it and everybody has to use it. And the second question, I think, is not a contradiction between what Mr. Bildt has said and what I have said. One figures the Annex corresponded to arms control, that it is in the hands of everybody to comply with it and the other thing is a balance that is trying to be achieved via some countries-not NATO-on the train and equip. Both things are compatible and everybody has to comply with the Dayton Agreement and the Train and Equip Program make some countries compatible with the NATO agreement. That is the only thing that they can say. I am not judging if it's good or it's bad-It's compatible with the NATO agreement. Q: Do you think that it affect the stabilization of peace? Because there clearly is no real arms control in this country and a lot of people are very worried now about the Train and Equip Program. Dr. Javier Solana: I think that the countries which are involved in the Train and Equip are sensible countries and they know what they are doing. Q: What we've seen in the past year was that NATO is obviously the dominant force here, and NATO has not been threatened directly by serious military force. Yet NATO remains structured in terms of dealing with problems here, largely to deal solely with real military threats to its troops. We've seen in Gajevi, earlier in the year, where American troops and Russian troops watched a mob of people burn down a number of houses. And their response, when we asked why did they do it, was, "Well, we're not equipped to deal with civilian disturbances. These are police matters." When often it's the authorities who control the police, who are encouraging these sorts of actions. Are there plans with NATO to actually deploy troops or military police or train troops or at least equip troops with the means necessary to deal with civilian disturbances? Because you're not usually faced with tanks-it's usually grannies with sticks and hatchets. Why are troops not equipped with, for instance, riot control gear, as opposed to simply heavy weapons? Dr. Javier Solana: You know very well what NATO is about, and therefore we are not prepared and we will not prepare to do police tasks. That's why we are cooperating in such a profound manner with the IPTF. The IPTF could not do their job without the environment of security which is guaranteed by NATO. But we cannot do it because we are not prepared and we will not be prepared to do police tasks. I think it's something that the whole international community has to think about: How do we (indiscernible) one of the important lessons we have to draw from this peace keeping operation in Bosnia. As you know, last summer was an important meeting in Dublin to consider these issues through the UN to (indiscernible) how an international police has to be set up. Because it's true that we have the first level of NATO forces, of peacekeeping forces, which, what they know how to do is to separate those who are fighting and then cooperate in other missions. You only bring about one of the aspects what you may call negative (indiscernible) remarks. You have to put also on the table the positive aspects that go beyond the strict military aspects and military obligation that NATO has done, or SFOR has done. You have been here long enough to remember how the Presidential elections were, how it took place. You know very well that without the cooperation of SFOR, going beyond what was a strict military operation, they did. It was impossible to imagine that the election would have taken place without the presence of SFOR. We opened roads, we (indiscernible), we did everything that had to be done in order to get a success in the elections. We'll continue doing that. But we have not prepared to do police work. What we can do is what we're doing now: Working together with the IPTF, giving them the environment of security so that those who are prepared to do that job can do it in a secure environment. Q: But in many cases here we find the police aren't willing to do their job. What do you feel should be done in terms of addressing this gap? There's a large gap between IPTF and SFOR and what each of them can do and are willing to do. Dr. Javier Solana: Well, we are trying to fill that gap in the manner I just told you: To have the IPTF in charge of the cooperation with the police forces on the ground, even of the parties, and guaranteeing the environment of security by SFOR troops. And as you know, that is working very well. And in particular, it is working very well on the checkpoints. In the last weeks and the last months, the new checkpoint policy is working very well with that type of arrangement, IPTF and SFOR. We have to draw a lesson from this and probably discuss at a different level in other institutions how to fill that gap. It may exist. It's something that may be taking place also in Albania now. So we have to think about that; the international community may have to think about that, how to fill that gap. Q: Do you see a scenario happening where you could have, as many are talking about, perhaps a European force left in Bosnia, with not necessarily bases, but perhaps training bases and no American involvement. Do you think that would be possible to maintain the peace here? Dr. Javier Solana: I think I said from the very beginning of the press conference that I am not prepared to talk about what is going to happen after July 1998. My responsibility now is to implement (indiscernible)from now until that date and not to talk about what is going to happen after that. Q: But it's just a philosophical question-I was just wondering whether- Dr. Javier Solana: Yes, but I do consider and pose myself philosophical questions lately in private. Q: Do you still expect that the former warring parties will hand over the war criminals to the war crime tribunals? Dr. Javier Solana: I very much hope so, yes. Q: And if not? Dr. Javier Solana: And if not-I'll tell you what I told you last time: That before the end of the mission of SFOR, I do very much hope that those who are indicted war criminals will be where they should be-In front of a tribunal.