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Science, Society and Security: Developing a Scientific Community to tackle New Security-Related Threats

A NATO Advanced Research Workshop, held at Cambridge, UK,
26-28 September 2004

Some Observations and Recommendations from the workshop

Internal links Workshop Support mechanisms Advanced Research Workshops (ARWs)

Observations:

• It is clear that many scientists are not aware of security issues nor are interested in them.
• There is a general problem of poor management of research policy and a lack of leadership as to priority areas. This applies at government level down to the institutions themselves.
• Funding, and security of long term funding in science and technology, is a major issue especially for the poorer countries. It is particularly the younger people who need to have hope of a job who can benefit from it and thus be less attracted to fundamentalist thinking.
• There is still too much separation between sectors (industry, academia and government.) 80% of companies in the UK have no involvement with the universities. The issue of ‘stove piping’ was everywhere within institutions and between different sectors- operational secrecy was at play. The problem was largely one of security clearance and thereby the reluctance to share information and work together.
• Three processes are required : interdisciplinary; inter institutional and multilateral education and activity. And more networking.
• One group emphasised the difference between hard and soft science issues: easier to collaborate with scientists and other actors in soft/civil science matters as there was no issue of security clearance. Harder issues attract more funding but more difficulties on a timeline due to time it takes to get security clearance for everyone concerned.

Recommendations:

• Need to up the political will in certain countries especially former Soviet countries so that scientific research in security related matters is given help and support required. NATO could be a major facilitator in making this happen.
• Better executive education could help raise awareness among decision makers of the need to work more closely with other departments and sectors and to prevent duplication and stove piping. This includes participants at meetings being fully aware of their role and what is expected of them so as not to stall progress through ignorance or misinformation.
• Selected scientists within institutions should obtain media training and become more proactive in having science and scientific views put across in the various media. By developing long term relationships with journalists they will raise their institutions’ profile and have a better chance to influence discussion at times of crises.
• More to be done to encourage the contact between academia and SMEs. The big companies do well out of collaboration, but the smaller companies need support and encouragement.
• This is particularly the case in developing countries where the age group most open to extremist influence could have the chance of developing constructive careers.
• Paradox, we have to be sensitive in suggesting ideas rather than imposing models. It is the imposing of western values that seems to be one of the main roots of the current terrorist threat.
• A huge presentation or PR job requires to be done (NATO could help) to have moderate muslims temper the image of the extremists. Focus too on more optimistic outcomes. Societies can be turned around as happened in New York when the community worked with the police force to reduce crime. Same could be done to reduce ongoing threat of terror operations.

Note: The views expressed and observations and recommendations made at this workshop reflect those of the participants in the workshop only. They should not be regarded as reflecting NATO views or policy.

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