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In the early 1990s, it became apparent that steps needed to be taken by the European members of NATO to assume greater responsibility for their common security and defence.
The process started with the official signing of the Treaty of Maastricht in February 1992. It included an agreement by the leaders of the European Union to develop a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) “including the eventual framing of a common defence policy which might lead to a common defence”. This agreement referred to the Western European Union (WEU) as an integral part of the development of the EU and a request to the WEU to elaborate and implement decisions and actions with defence implications on behalf of the EU.
Concurrently, the WEU Council in June 1992 adopted the “Petersberg Declaration” which included a summing-up of the so-called Petersberg tasks.
NATO also recognised the need to develop a European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI) within the organisation that would be both an integral part of the adaptation of NATO’s political and military structures and an important contributing factor to the development of European defence capabilities. Both these processes have been carried forward on the basis of the Treaty of Maastricht, which entered into force on 1 November 1993, and the subsequent European treaties and Alliance decisions taken at successive summit meetings.
In January 1994, NATO Heads of State and Government announced their readiness to make collective assets of the Alliance available, after consultations in the North Atlantic Council, for WEU operations undertaken by the European allies in pursuit of their Common Foreign and Security Policy. Following this announcement, the concept of Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTFs) was launched. Its purpose is to provide more flexible and deployable forces able to respond to the new demands of all Alliance missions, as well as providing separable but not separate deployable headquarters that could be employed by the WEU. It formed the conceptual basis for future operations involving NATO and other non-NATO countries.
Meetings of NATO foreign and defence ministers held in Berlin and Brussels, in June 1996, reaffirmed support for building the European Security and Defence Identity within NATO to rebalance roles and responsibilities between Europe and North America. It was also decided that Alliance assets be made available for WEU-led crisis management operations.
Most of the organisational arrangements between NATO and the WEU were in place by 1999 and were put to the test during a joint crisis management exercise in February 2000 (CMX/CRISEX 2000). These arrangements included:
The assets requested could then be made available for the WEU’s use by the North Atlantic Council on a case-by-case basis. Conditions for their transfer to the WEU, as well as for monitoring their use and for their eventual return or recall, would be registered in a specific agreement between the two organisations. During the operation, NATO would monitor the use of its assets and regular political liaison with the WEU would be maintained. European commanders from the NATO command structure could be nominated to act under WEU political control. The assets would be returned to NATO at the end of the operation or when required. Throughout the operation, including its preparatory phase, NATO and the WEU would consult closely.
The arrangements made for cooperation between NATO and the WEU from 1991 to 2000 laid the groundwork for the subsequent development of the strategic partnership between NATO and the EU.
The Maastricht Treaty had already introduced the concept of a European Common Foreign and Security Policy, but impetus for direct EU participation was given by the Franco-British Summit at St Malo in December 1998, when both countries agreed that the EU “must have the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them, and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crises”. This decision opened the way for the adoption of practical measures within the EU to put it into effect.
On 1 May 1999, the Amsterdam Treaty entered into force. This Treaty, signed in October 1997, incorporated the WEU’s so-called “Petersberg tasks” (humanitarian search and rescue tasks, peace-keeping tasks, crisis management tasks including peaceenforcment, and environmental protection), which implied that the EU would take on these tasks in the future. At its meeting in Cologne in June 1999, the European Council agreed to give the EU the means and capabilities needed for the implementation of a common European Security and Defence Policy. This was a turning point for the development of a European defence.
The role previously undertaken by the WEU was being progressively assumed by the EU. At its ministerial meeting in Marseilles in November 2000, the WEU decided to transfer the functions it originally had to conduct the Petersberg tasks to the European Union. The residual WEU responsibilities relating to the modified 1954 Treaty of Brussels, i.e., the collective defence commitments, remained unaffected and are now handled by a much-reduced formal political structure and a small secretariat. However, by December 1999, the operational role of the WEU was transferred to the EU.
With the transfer of responsibilities from the WEU to the EU, the relationship between NATO and the EU took on a new dimension. The basis of the work initiated with the WEU was transferred to EU institutions and measures were put into place to allow for concrete cooperation.
At their meeting in Washington in April 1999, NATO Heads of State and Government had identified outstanding questions that needed to be addressed to allow for practical cooperation with the EU. These questions related to:
In addition, a Defence Capabilities Initiative (DCI) was launched in Washington to strengthen the military capabilities of all Allies, and not just those of European Allies.
At Washington – and at subsequent meetings – the fundamental principles needed to develop ESDI were set out and are as follows:
Detailed arrangements between NATO and the EU, known as the “Berlin-Plus” arrangements (see above), were subsequently developed on the basis of these principles. At the same time, the EU decided to put into place permanent political and military structures, including a Political and Security Committee, a Military Committee and a Military Staff, to ensure the necessary political guidance and strategic direction for such operations. The EU also decided to develop arrangements for full consultation, cooperation and transparency with NATO and to ensure the necessary dialogue, consultation and cooperation with European NATO members which are not members of the EU on issues related to European security and defence policy and crisis management.
As well as putting into place the principles and procedures necessary for two international organisations to be able to cooperate, NATO and the EU recognised the need to improve the military capabilities of their members. Major shortfalls had already been made evident during the Kosovo crisis (1999) and needed to be addressed should the EU and/or European members of the Alliance (and Canada) wish to engage in a crisis management operation without the commitment of NATO as a whole. Improving military capabilities was ultimately a fundamental aspect of ESDI and many of the shortfalls identified by NATO under the DCI overlapped with those the EU had to address, such as greater air and sea lift. Improving military capabilities was a critical building block for a credible EU defence capability.
The Helsinki meeting of the European Council held in December 1999 established a “Headline Goal” for EU members in terms of their military capabilities for crisis management operations. The objective of the Headline Goal was to enable the EU, by the year 2003, to deploy and sustain for at least one year, military forces of up to 60000 troops to undertake the full range of the so-called Petersberg tasks set out in the Amsterdam Treaty of 1997.
Mid-2000, Alliance experts began contributing military and technical advice to the work of EU experts on the establishment of a catalogue of forces and capabilities for the EU Headline Goal, in preparation of the EU’s Capabilities Commitment Conference in November 2000. By November 2001, the EU had created the European Capability Action Plan (ECAP), which aimed to identify additional capability (by procurement or non-procurement initiatives) and implement concrete projects through acquisition or other solutions such as leasing, multinationalisation and considering possibilities for role specialisation.
The Helsinki “Headline Goal” has since been superseded by objectives set in the “Headline Goal” for 2010, which, inter alia., envisages the launching of rapid reaction units composed of joint battle groups. This proposal was put forward by France, Germany and the United Kingdom in February 2004.
In parallel to the efforts made by the EU, NATO revisited the issue of defence capabilities and replaced the Defence Capabilities Initiative by the Prague Capabilities Commitment. Launched at its Summit in November 2002, this initiative had the advantage of identifying priority areas and establishing a monitoring mechanism to verify if commitments had been respected by member countries. In addition, NATO took on the task of reviewing its defence planning process, therefore tackling two complementary processes at the same time.
In order to develop effective military capability requirements common to the two organisations, the NATO-EU Capability Group was established. It met for the first time in May 2003 and has had meetings since. It helps to ensure consistency between activities underway in the ECAP and the Prague Capabilities Commitment, and the coordination between the NATO Response Force and the EU Battle groups, in full respect of the autonomy of both the EU and NATO.
While the key components to establishing a solid working relationship were being put into place, the first EU High Representative for Common and Foreign Security Policy was appointed in October 1999. Former NATO Secretary General, Javier Solana, filled the position created by the Amsterdam Treaty in 1997. Shortly afterwards, he was also appointed Secretary General of the WEU. With a highly visible interlocutor in place, the EU could start projecting itself in diplomatic circles and playing the role of mediator in potential conflict situations.
More prosaic tasks, however, remained to be completed. In July 2000, NATO Allies agreed to an EU proposal to set up NATO-EU ad-hoc working groups to accelerate progress in four specific areas: security arrangements; developing permanent arrangements for consultation and cooperation between the two organisations; defining modalities for EU access to NATO and assets; and EU capability goals.
The same month, NATO and the EU Council Secretariat established an interim security agreement key to their working relationship since it governed the exchange of classified information between the two organisations. This paved the way for the conclusion of a formal NATO-EU security of information agreement signed in Athens on 14 March 2003. The other joint NATO-EU Ad Hoc Working Groups also met from mid-2000 to help put into place modalities and procedures for closer cooperation.
The North Atlantic Council and the European interim Political and Security Committee of the European Union met for the first time in September 2000 to take stock of the progress in NATO-EU relations. Three months later in December, with the signing of the Treaty of Nice by the European Council, amendments were introduced to reflect the operative developments of ESDP as an independent EU policy (entry into force in February 2003).
The exchange of letters between the Secretary General of NATO and the Presidency of the EU on 24 January 2001, marked the beginning of institutionalised relations between the two organisations. It provided for joint meetings at ambassadorial and ministerial levels and since then, regular meetings of the EU Political and Security Committee and the North Atlantic Council have become a normal feature of security cooperation. Both organisations also committed themselves to stepping up consultation in times of crisis.
The first formal meeting of NATO and EU Foreign Ministers was held in Budapest in May 2001, in the margins of the Ministerial meeting of the North Atlantic Council. It was at this meeting that the NATO Secretary General and the EU Presidency issued their first joint statement on the Western Balkans (a common strategy for the Western Balkans was issued on 29 July 2003).
In spring 2001, the Secretary General of NATO was invited for the first time to brief the EU General Affairs Council on NATO policy. Within NATO, work on the principal issues facing the further development of ESDI continued during 2001 and 2002, in particular the identification of a range of European command options; the presumption of availability of pre-identified assets and capabilities; the adaptation of Alliance defence planning; and NATO-EU consultations in times of crisis.
The events of September 11 2001, provided a further incentive to reinforce cooperation between NATO and the EU in the field of crisis management. Formal contacts and reciprocal participation in meetings increased. On 12 September 2001, the Secretary General of NATO participated in deliberations of the EU General Affairs Council to analyse the international situation following the terrorist attacks on the United States. Since then, the terrorist attacks in Madrid (March 2004) have tragically stressed the need for greater cooperation in this field. Direct contacts between the two organisations have been developed in a number of fields in addition to the fight against terrorism.
At their Summit in Prague, November 2002, NATO members declared their readiness to give the EU access to NATO assets and capabilities for operations in which the Alliance is not engaged militarily. This was followed by the historic EU-NATO Declaration on European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) in December 2002 and the agreement, in March 2003, on the set of key cooperation documents, known as the 'Berlin-Plus' package.
From then on, practical cooperation could go ahead in the area of crisis management:
