Eng.
/ Fr.
In essence, defence planning existed during the Cold War but "operational planning", in the sense that we now know it, did not. This was because it was the task of force (and nuclear) planning to identify all the forces required to implement the collective defence war plans and members were expected to assign and employ the requested forces virtually without question. These war plans were, in effect, the only "operational plans" of the era.
When, after the Cold War, the Alliance started to get involved in non-Article 5 operations, i.e. not collective defence operations, the situation had to change. Since non-Article 5 missions are, by agreement, case-by-case and the provision of national forces is discretionary, the automaticity of availability associated with force planning during the Cold War period was lost. This led to the requirement for "force generation conferences" to solicit the necessary forces and "operational planning" to develop the plans for these non-Article 5 missions.
These developments led, quite naturally, to a requirement to adjust the existing processes so that "defence planning" disciplines no longer focused exclusively on meeting collective defence requirements and the needs of static warfare. Forces, assets, capabilities and facilities now had to be capable of facing threats posed by failed states, ethnic rivalry, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and terrorism. In fact, acknowledging the ever-changing situation and recognising the benefits of harmonisation and coordination, the existing procedures need to be reviewed on a regular basis and adjusted as appropriate.
