ISAF Video Tele Conference

Interview with BRIGADIER GENERAL JOE VOTEL (Deputy Commanding General for Operations, Regional Command East)

BRIGADIER GENERAL JOE VOTEL (Deputy Commanding General for Operations, Regional Command East): Okay. Thank you very much, thank you very much. Well good morning to all from Bagram airfield, Afghanistan. As mentioned, I am Brigadier General Joe Votel. I'm the Deputy Commanding General for Operations here in Regional Command East. I want to thank you for the opportunity to talk with you today about our mission here in Regional Command East.

In conjunction with the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, joint inter-agency, international and multi-national forces, Regional Command East is conducting full spectrum operations to neutralize insurgent forces in our assigned area of responsibility, develop Afghan National Security capabilities and support the growth of governance and development in order to build a more stable Afghanistan.

We remain very, very optimistic about this mission and the future of Afghanistan. On a day to day basis, we continue to see progress in security, governance and development. There has been an increase in violence in Regional Command East, but we believe this is due in part to our aggressive combined operations - an added brigade plus of ISAF combat forces and a greater and more capable number of Afghan National Security Forces - plus the fact that we are now operating in more areas than we were previously. The targeting and elimination of top and mid-level leaders, coupled with the growing support of the population and a committed Afghan security force apparatus have also led to more aggressive tactics by the insurgents. Increasingly, especially in Regional Command East, the Afghan National Security Forces are in the lead. Over the last three months, the Afghan National Army has taken the lead in planning and executing two major operations that are achieving significant effects in previously troubled areas.

The Afghan National Police are making improvements as well. In a recent survey conducted in Regional Command East over 85 percent of the population agreed that the police helped improve security.

Regional Command East supports Afghanistan's national development strategy which provides the framework for security, development and governance. The licit economy is growing. Afghan GDP experienced an increased growth of 14 percent last year. Over a third of the population expresses satisfaction with the availability of jobs and electricity, and over half rate the availability of medical care, clean drinking water and education as good.

In Regional Command East, over 80 percent of the boys and 40 percent of the girls are attending school. That's a 400 percent increase since 2001. And about two thirds of the population has access to a clinic or a hospital. In Regional Command East over 450 kilometres of roads have been built in the 10 months that this iteration of the Regional Command East headquarters has been in place.

Additionally, here in Regional Command East we're seeing good governance begin to emerge. Appointed Governors are showing that they're responsive to the needs of the people. We continue to see improvements in the planning capabilities of the provincial development councils; villages and districts are beginning to accept authority of their government and in a number of instances are actively objecting so-called insurgent shadow leadership and their strong arm tactics.

Challenges remain however. Expectations of the people are quick to outpace the capabilities of the growing government. Insurgents continue to use intimidation tactics and are targeting Afghan National Security Forces. Growth in the judicial sector continues to be at a slower pace than we would all like and corruption remains a concern for everyone. We are confident however that with the will of the Afghan people, the continuing commitment of their government and the assistance of the international community we will prevail over all these challenges.

The forces in Regional Command East are proud to be assisting the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, the Afghan National Security Forces and our international partners as we bring development, security and stability to the people of Afghanistan. I'd be happy to answer any of your questions.

MODERATOR:Thank you General. Okay Brooks first.

Q: Brooks Tigner, Jane's here. Thank you General. That was a very interesting presentation. Balanced and you gave the good and the bad. We appreciate that, at least I do. I wanted to ask you – you mentioned a couple of catch phrases here that caught my attention - the Taliban's strong-arm tactics and their tactics to intimidate. Could you be a little more specific? Leaving aside the shift... or any changes in their propaganda techniques I'm not interested in that. I wonder if you could tell us on the ground what kind of shift of tactics do you see them doing now that you're taking a more aggressive stance there? In other words, what sort of equipment and tactics... new equipment or tactics are they using against the Afghan army and against ISAF.

Thank you.

VOTEL: Okay thank you. Well first of all when I refer to intimidation, this could be anywhere from the horrific like beheadings that are designed to send an example to people, a very clear example to things that are a little less lethal; things like night letters that are designed to warn people. So there's really kind of a wide variety of things that they do that fall within that very broad spectrum that I laid out for you there that they use to intimidate people.

In a lot of these outlying villages, the people are poor. The government is working to extend their reach out there. It may not be there and so they become very susceptible to these types of intimidation tactics and so that's what I'm referring to.

With respect to the other part of your question in terms of some of the shifting tactics, we obviously watch this very, very closely. As our forces continue to gain experience here, as the Afghan forces continue to gain experience here, we modify our tactics. We try to do things different, more smartly, and I would suggest to you that the insurgents do the same thing. What we see is increased use in some cases of heavier weapons designed to potentially impact our aircraft or some of the up-armoured vehicles that we have. We continue to see use of improvised explosive devices, in some cases approaching greater levels of sophistication to address some of the counter-measures that we have in place.

And then I think in terms of the general tactics that we see on the ground, we do see some improvement in them trying to actually combine fire and movement to create temporary technical advantages over our forces. They are adapting their techniques and we are adapting as well. So I think those are a few examples for you of what we're seeing.

Q: This is Paul Ames from the Associated Press. General you've been there several months now. When you talk about the evolution of the enemy's tactics, would you say that they have become a tougher enemy now than they were when you first arrived there, given how they've managed to adapt their tactics?

And secondly a related question: to what extent are foreign fighters an issue there in the eastern region? We've heard reports about Arabs, Chechens, people coming over the border from Pakistan. What is the extent of that problem? How many foreign fighters do you think you're fighting against? How well equipped are they? How well trained are they? And how well integrated are they with the Afghans?

VOTEL: Okay well I think... let me start with the last half of your question there on the foreign fighters. I think it's been fairly well discussed in the open press that there are some concerns about foreign presence in Afghanistan here coming from a variety of sources that are influencing things. Personally I think what the foreign fighters do is they bring a little bit of leadership, they bring some better tactics and techniques that they may be imparting to some of the other insurgent groups here that allow them to operate a bit more effectively.

In terms of the numbers, I'm not sure that we have a very good estimate or that I would even proffer an estimate to you on the numbers that are out there. We certainly see indications of this in the way that some of the insurgents are operating. We continue to watch that very, very closely and through our co-operative efforts with the neighbours here. Pakistan is trying to interdict any movement of those type of forces, as well as other insurgents into this area.

I'm sorry. Can you repeat the first part of your question there?

Q: I was just looking back over your experience in the time since you've been there. Given the evolution in the tactics of the enemy, would you say they are a tougher enemy now than they were when you arrived?

VOTEL: Yeah. Thank you. I think... my answer isn't yes. My answer is the enemy evolves. We've had deliberate efforts to go after the leadership, both at the mid and high level to disrupt them. I think we've been successful in doing that. We've removed a number of key leaders and certain leaders off the battlefield here in Regional Command East, either killed or captured. That has disrupted them. That caused I think some disruption in the way that they were conducting their operations. Any time any type of organization lacks leadership, then of course it lacks the right direction and guidance to move on in a co-ordinated fashion. So I think we saw some effects in the insurgent formations with the loss of leadership. Over time we've now started I think to see some leadership begin to try to fill that vacuum. So we continue to stay focused on targeting and disrupting that mid and high level leadership.

Certainly I think as the Afghan Security Forces have increased their capabilities, we have seen the insurgents see that capability and we've seen an increase in some of the targeting of the Afghan Security Forces. Nearly 50 percent of all the casualties here are Afghan National Security Forces. So as they increasingly improve their capabilities and increasingly take the lead and become more and more involved in the defence of their own country, then they are becoming more targeted as well.

The other techniques that we've seen... obviously there has been a slight increase in IEDs, up about 24 percent over the last year. Suicide attacks are up about 17 percent over the last year. So we see the insurgents continuing to use those techniques as well. If I could just have a moment though, I will tell you I think those techniques are backfiring on them because a large majority of the casualties, particularly with suicide bombings, over 60 percent of the casualties are civilians. So innocent Afghan civilians who are being subjected to these type of things. So clearly to me that demonstrates while they've chosen those tactics, they are not being effective for them and they're targeting the very people they would try to lead.

Q: Good morning. Radio Free Europe, Radio Liberty. As you say, the intensity of the conflict is clearly increasing. As you get stronger, the enemy evolves and adapts. What will it take, in your opinion, to change that dynamic? To reach a sort of fall off point after which the enemy will get weaker rather than stronger?

And secondly, speaking of foreign fighters, I'm particularly interested in these references to Chechens, that one comes across every now and then. To your knowledge has a Chechen ever been apprehended in Afghanistan?

Thank you.

VOTEL: Thanks. I don't have any direct evidence of Chechen fighters in our particular area since we've been there. Obviously we have heard reports of that that come through all the various intelligence sources that we have access too, but I don't have any direct knowledge to support that on the Chechens.

With regard to the other piece on the increase in activity. I do want to emphasize that the initiative in our view belongs very clearly with ISAF here. We have been very aggressive in conducting our operations, in exhibiting our freedom of movement and going to the places where we needed to go to help extend governance and development and get the government down there. We have made the significant effort in improving the capabilities of the Afghan National Security Forces. The initiative in my view lies with ISAF and with the Afghan National Security Forces. So any insurgent efforts to mount a spring offensive or something in the fall here... while there have certainly been incidents and events, any kind of offensive from the insurgent standpoint has not been successful here.

The increase in activity here I think is accountable and a large portion due to the fact that we more than doubled the amount of ISAF combat forces in this area, particularly U.S. forces and Polish forces, the Polish battle group is a key component to what we're doing here. We now have a much larger portion of the Afghan National Security Forces out operating. We are in more districts - we are across all of our 14 provinces - than we've ever been. We are in areas where ISAF forces have not been before and where the insurgents have had some free movement. So now we are in their support areas interdicting them, causing them to react.

So I think that accounts for a lot of what has been reported as the increase in violence, increase in activity; most of that is being done on our terms. The strategy I think remains okay what we've been doing. We'll continue to target mid and high level leadership to disrupt their formations. We continue to get the Afghan National Security Forces in the lead and get them making the calls out there among their people and helping lead the fight against the insurgents and getting them into positions where we can bring the unique capabilities of ISAF to leverage the advantage that it offers.

Q: Brooks Tigner, Jane's again. General I wanted to come back to IEDs. Two questions. Unless that's coming from a very low base, I wouldn't call a 24 percent increase "a slight increase." Maybe it is if it's starting from a low base. Could you comment on that and maybe give some numbers rather than just a percentage if that's available?

And secondly related to IEDs, indeed if you're stepping up the pressure on the Taliban, this is precisely one of the tactics that they will use, they will have to use, is a massive increase in the sophistication and use of IEDs. So my question to you is how do you protect against that? Is it via mainly more caution or restrictions on where your soldiers should go, or are you looking for different kinds... new kinds of capability to detect these IEDs and are you satisfied with the kind of detection and protection capability against IEDs that you currently have?

Thank you.

VOTEL: First of all, I may have mischaracterized that. You are correct; about a 24 percent increase is probably something more than a slight increase. I don't have the exact numbers right here in front of me on what those would be. I do know from watching IED development here in Afghanistan over the course of several years it has started with relatively small numbers here and is increasing. I certainly don't want to minimize the impact or the increase in that particular tactic here that is being used and so we do watch that very, very closely.

With regards to how we deal with that, there is a variety of things that we can do. First and foremost from a military standpoint is training all of our forces to be able to operate in this environment. There are tactics, there are techniques that we can use that help minimize exposure to these things, to these particular types of attacks. So, that's a key part. Awareness of the environment in which you're operating, indicators of IEDs in the area, good information from local civilians are all important aspects of that.

Second of all, we recognize that we have to continue to target the insurgent cells that are using this tactic and so we are very aggressive in our targeting of those IED facilitators. IED makers are certainly at the top or very near the top of our list of insurgents that we want to kill or capture on the battlefield and disrupt their operations.

Third thing I think is making best use of the technology that is available out there, whether it is electronic systems that help us or whether it's up-armoury that allows us to provide a greater level of protection. So there are a variety of things we can do. I doubt very seriously and I have seen absolutely no intention on our part to try to modify our tactics to prevent us from going into the areas that we need to go into or to do the things that we need to do. We have the capability to go out and clear areas of these types of threats so that we can continue to operate in that area. That's what we will continue to pursue.

Q: Paul Ames again from the Associated Press. If I could go back to what you were saying about the targeting of the Taliban leadership in the area. Could you tell us a little bit more about that? Is this a new tactic which you've evolved? Go after the leaders of the insurgents? Presumably that relies a lot on intelligence. Could you tell us a little bit about how you're gaining that intelligence, how you manage to identify the leaders of the insurgency? And how do you go after them? Are you launching snatch raids to try and grab them? Are they being targeted in battlefields? Are there hide-outs being bombed? How do you go after them?

VOTEL: Okay thank you. Some of what you raise is not proper for me to go into the different techniques and methods that we're using to gather intelligence. I would just tell you we make absolutely full use of all available resources we have across the whole spectrum of intelligence disciplines to try to combine them. Our goal is not to look at any one thing, but is to try to fuse as much information as we can together to get an understanding of what the insurgent network looks like, who is in charge of it and then the different techniques that we might use to go after them, whether it's an operation, a raid, to try to kill or capture them or to disrupt them by whatever other means that we can.

Key in all this is the Afghan people and making sure that we leverage the human intelligence that is out there, the information that is available onto the battlefield. We are partnered with the Afghan National Security Force, intelligence agencies and departments, from the Ministry of Defence, from the Afghan National Police, working with them to share information back and forth so that we don't create walls between ourselves but we break those walls down and we share information.

So our approach is fusion of all available resources here to paint the very best picture, to get an understanding of what the network looks like and then try to attack those parts of the network that demonstrate the most vulnerability. In most cases that involves somewhere around the leadership here. We want to try to separate the leadership from the remainder of the cell. By doing that we know we create a disruption. We can create some effects out there. As we continue to be persistent in doing other operations, then we continue to sustain that disruption.

Q: Radio Free Europe, Radio Liberty again. The ongoing Pakistani military operation in the tribal areas - what effect if any is that having on your work ?

Thank you.

VOTEL: Yes thank you. I think right now we watch the situation in Pakistan very closely as we always do here and we have a very good partnership with our counterparts on that side of the border. I personally meet with my counterpart from the general headquarters and our Afghan counterpart on about a monthly basis where we discuss co-operative issues here and we have good liaison back and forth. I can call my counterpart on the Pakistan side from the phone on my desk. So that's the kind of relationship that we have. We've got a good relationship in place. We're not seeing any direct impact right now of what may be happening over there and influencing onto us.

In fact, as I look over the last month or so, the number of border incidents along the Regional Command East/Pakistan border has actually dropped about 19 percent. So we're not seeing any direct impact. Obviously we continue to watch that. We continue to share information. We continue to maintain strong co-operation and co-ordination and communication between all the partners that operate in the border area: the Afghan National Security Forces, the Pak military and the Frontier Corps and of course ISAF forces.

Q: Brooks Tigner again. Change of subject. Regarding precision air drops; I've heard some encouraging results over the last year over the use of precision air drops in Afghanistan. Could you comment on that and how effective it has been? Have you seen some concrete positive results in terms of using precision air drop? And a minor question - have there been any problems with them? Has the insurgency begun targeting the air drops even though these may not be high value air drops? Nevertheless, have there been any attempts by them to mangle or destroy the air drop deployment?

Thank you.

VOTEL: Okay thanks. Well yeah we actually have seen very good use of precision air drops and other air drop operations that we're doing here in Afghanistan. We have not seen any increase in insurgent reaction to this. On occasion we do lose some that may fall into their hands, but that number has generally been very minimal in the 10 months that we have been here. 

As you are aware, the nature of the terrain, all the other environmental aspects that are present here in Afghanistan and the fact that we need to be out among the people doing our business requires that we deploy all of our forces in a manner that allows us to do that. So we do have a lot of smaller fire bases and positions out there that do require re-supply, air re-supply, particularly this precision capability really allows us to get it there and get it there right at the right spot. Obviously our interest and our support for this is that it minimizes exposure of our troops. If we can put it right where they are ready to receive it, then that's an exception capability. So we continue to work with the ISAF air forces to do that and then with just some of the other local re-supply that we do of trying to get it right where our troops need it and trying to minimize their vulnerability and exposure to the insurgents as they recover that and bring it back into their bases.

Q: General you mentioned the Polish soldiers who are serving with you out there in the east. There was a - I'm looking at it here - a news story out of Warsaw yesterday that six Polish soldiers have been charged with murder actually in Poland over an incident in Paktika province in August where apparently a village came under fire and civilians were killed. I'm wondering could you tell us anything about that incident? And more generally, what is the impact on relations with the Afghans when you have incidents where civilians are killed and what specific steps are you taking to avoid such incidents?

VOTEL: Thank you very much. Well first of all out of respect for the Polish forces and the soldiers who are dealing with this issue now, I won't comment on any particular aspects of that. That is obviously an issue of national responsibility and we will co-operate in whatever manner is required. I will tell you that the Polish battle group who recently conducted a relief in place here between their first and second element has performed superbly here in Afghanistan. We are very, very satisfied with their performance. They did very, very well and they quickly integrated into other battlefields and they have been excellent partners. As they've come in, they've brought in some additional resources this time - UAVs and additional civil affairs specialists - into their formation. So they remain key partners in this and we're very glad to have them in Regional Command East.

With regards to the civilian casualties' issue - this obviously remains an area of concern for us. We believe we are making progress in this area with less instances of those types of events occurring here in Regional Command East. We take all of these very, very seriously. A key part of our approach to this is when these do occur or when they're suspected to occur, is to quickly notify Afghan National Security Forces; to get others involved such as UNAMA to come and assist us in helping conduct investigations and ensure that we understand all the facts of what occurred.

We take full accountability when there are casualties as a result of operations that we conduct. We have a very good process I think of going out and meeting with the local elders trying to discuss the incident and trying to determine mechanisms that we can use to minimize further instances of this. Certainly within this training is a key aspect. We are always talking with our forces about that. We review all of our operations very, very carefully and closely to ensure we try to minimize instances of that happening. So I think we are doing all that we can do right now to help minimize these types of situations. I think we're making good progress in that particular area.

I will tell that while we take responsibility for civilian casualties and for our part in that, the Taliban, the insurgents, don't. They operate in a manner that recklessly exposes civilians to danger and on a number of occasions we have seen - whether it's pilots in the air or forces on the ground - make difficult decisions, assess the situation and withdraw their fires or divert their fires or do something else to minimize exposure to this. So we try to look for those. We study it very carefully. We reinforce that and we try to make sure our soldiers and leaders on the ground are making the best decisions to protect their forces and to protect civilians out on the battlefield.

Q: General, coming back to your earlier point about your control being extended over the larger number of districts and this accounting for the higher intensity of the conflict, what proportion of the RC East territory is outside your permanent control, if any? And secondly, do you have enough troops? In the south for example, troop numbers are a problem. Do you have enough troops to exert control over your inside territory?

Thank you.

VOTEL: Thank you for that. Of 159 districts in Regional Command East and the 14 provinces that we have, I would estimate probably about roughly half of those have some type of ISAF force that operates in them, either permanently or moves into them on a regular basis. Maybe a little bit more that we do that. There of course are a number of districts and some areas where we don't have a presence on a regular basis. In those particular cases, there are some very good reasons why we don't and in those instances the security situation is not of the nature that we need to have forces positioned out there. So what we're able to do is use our Provincial Reconstruction Teams to go out there and meet with the elders or the government officials in that area, the district leaders, and work development projects or help extend the reach of the government.

Because we don't have forces in there, doesn't mean we're not operating out there. In fact, yesterday in Wardak province we were able to get the Governor and the Turkish Provincial Reconstruction Team leader and some of his staff out into two districts where we don't have forces. They were able to meet with them, had a very successful shura and began to make some plans for some development efforts out there.

So there are ways to offset that. With regard to the need for more forces, over the last 10 months the United States has doubled the amount of its combat forces here from one brigade to two. We've added the Polish battle group, which is a force of roughly over 1,000 soldiers; that is very, very significant. So we've significantly enhanced our security posture here in Regional Command East.

Would more forces be useful? Certainly. There's not many Commanders that wouldn't say he could use more forces. But that's not necessarily what we're looking for. Our interest really is in using the ISAF forces we have to partner with the Afghan National Security Forces and get them out in front. So we work very closely with the training and command down in Kabul to help get these new formations out into the provinces, out into the core areas, so they can become operational and they can take the lead.

We are working very closely with the police forces and they are located in many, if not all, of the districts out there from a training standpoint to get them out to provide local security. So those are some of the things that we are trying to do. If we could have a modest increase that would be great, but I think we've got a pretty good situation going here in Regional Command East right now.

Q: Question about UAVs. These have been used heavily in Iraq and their use is on the increase in Afghanistan as well, and as you know better than we, they can be used for a wide range of things - intelligence, real time operation picture targeting. Could you please tell us how UAVs are being used in your area and what are some of the lessons learned so far, if any? Some of the operational conclusions that you've drawn for the future?

Thank you.

VOTEL: Okay good. I don't know that we have any special techniques here in Afghanistan that would be different than other places where they might be used. We certainly use them for surveillance or watching areas that we may not have forces in that we want to watch. We use it to provide over-watch for forces that are involved in operations. We use them to over-watch areas in which we're flying helicopters or in which we may have smaller elements operating and we want to provide them a little extra effort here with some overhead surveillance. So we try to do all those things.

I think the important thing that we are trying to do and the big lesson learned here for us is that we try to combine all of our resources and try to create the broader effect from all of those things. So we want to be looking at areas with our UAVs that we can cover with our fires. We want to make sure that if we have any other ground surveillance systems out there or ground intelligence collections systems, that they are operating in conjunction with the areas where our UAVs are surveilling.

So for us it's about fusion and it's about making the very best use of all of our assets and that usually is in combination with each other and not separately and singly. So our big lesson learned is that we try to fuse these things together, use different assets to play off the capabilities of each other to create a much better picture out on the battlefield for us.

Q: Just a follow-up on that. That's a very complicated thing - fusing all the data sharing between UAVs and all the other assets on the ground and in the air. Is it working there and have you tried using that for targeting? Thank you.

VOTEL: Yes absolutely, almost all of our levels, at the battalion level, particularly at the brigade level and certainly here at the Regional Command East level, we have fusion cells that are designed to help pull this information together, have operators, have intelligence specialists in there that are looking at this information and sharing it, not only among themselves, but with all the other partners that may be operating out on the battlefield.

Q: General I'd like to ask you a question as somebody who is down there about how the war is portrayed back home? This is an issue which has come up in some of the European countries - the military in Afghanistan feels that maybe their efforts are not appreciated back home; that the public in general and the media have not correctly portrayed what is happening down there and therefore there's a perceived lack of public support for the operation. I wonder whether you'd noticed that, whether you had any feelings about that and whether you see any kind of impact on the moral of the troops down here because of that issue?

VOTEL: First of all I don't think I see any particular impact on the morale of the troops with regards to that. The soldiers out there - and I do have an opportunity several times a week to go out and visit units across Regional Command East, so I get to see them on a regular basis - they understand what's happening out there. They see it first hand every day. As they operate in an area, they see the progress that is being made out there. So I don't think it affects them very much.

With regards to public opinion, I think from my own country having just recently been home on my leave, there's not a significant amount of coverage of Afghanistan in the press, but yet when I talk to people they are all - at least citizens, friends, family - they are all very, very supportive of the efforts that we have going on here in Afghanistan and our portion of it here in Regional Command East. I will tell you we try to make an effort here in Regional Command East whenever we get a visitor, particularly one that comes from a European country, to get them down and see what we're doing. So I've tried to make an effort with some of the senior European officers in the ISAF headquarters to get them down to see what we're doing. We very frequently get representatives from the NATO headquarters there that come down and visit us.

So one of the best things we think we can do is get them out to see what our soldiers are doing on the ground. In most cases when they see that, they understand that this isn't just a lethal fight here. It is very much a fight about keeping the insurgents away from the people, providing the opportunities for development to come in and do good things and then trying to transform the environment and I think we're very, very successful in doing that.

I think if you look at the Khost province in particular, this is an area that has all the characteristics of being a problem area in Afghanistan. It has a large border area, it has a history of insurgency there, but yet it has a very progressive Governor. It has a provincial development council that is working and planning. We don't have a huge number of ISAF forces there, but we do have a very good partnership between the ISAF forces we have there and the Afghan National Security Forces and they are working in conjunction with each other to do this.

Just recently the Governor of that province, along with the provincial development council, went to Kabul with some of the Parliamentary members from Khost province and met with a number of NGOs trying to increase investment and interest into that particular area. So I think there is a lot of good things going on. We have got to continue to do as good an effort as we can to get the good stories out. So we continue to try to do that in whatever form that we can.

I mean the fact that I'm talking to you here today I think is a good example of it. I've asked to do this particular press conference right here because you're an audience we want to address. We want to tell you about the good things that are happening here. So we clearly recognize that we've got to address the audiences out there. We want to get the good word out and we're happy to take visitors out into Regional Command East and show them the good things that are happening.

Q: General I appreciate the point about getting the ANA out there and getting it to take over most of the responsibility over time for security, but in your contact with the local elders, the shuras, what are they telling you? How long would they like you to stay in the area?

Thank you.

VOTEL: In most cases in Regional Command East they do want ISAF forces to stay. They see the goodness that ISAF brings to the area, to the stabilizing effect that it has and to the resources that it brings to help the country. I think in almost every place I visit when I have an opportunity to talk with the Governor, they are very supportive of what we're doing. When we talk with tribal elders, they are very, very supportive of the things that we're doing. They are also very, very proud of the progress that their own security forces are making.

As we conclude operations anywhere in Regional Command East, when we conclude one of our tactical operations out there, we always try to finish it up with key leader engagements. Certainly the shuras are a key part of this. I recently attended a shura at the end of one of our operations. We had three different provincial Governors, we had Members of Parliament that came down from Kabul and we had tribal elders that were all involved there.

The whole idea here is after we made a commitment of ISAF forces and Afghan National Security Forces into an area to conduct operations for a period, when we start creating some effects, we clearly recognize that getting the tribal elders, getting the government to grab onto that and sustain that is very, very important. So we clearly recognize the importance of that and we try to use shuras to try to help get that word out. So as we conclude an operation, we'll spend another week or more going around and doing shuras in local villages or in districts to understand and ensure people they have what they need, they understand the effects that have been achieved, and we have a plan to continue to sustain it.

Q: A follow-up. Have they given you any concrete indication as to the actual length of the term that they'd like you to stay there for? I mean that must come up in your conversations with the locals.

VOTEL: Not necessarily. They haven't given me any particular indication we want you here for another year or whatever it happens to be. I think as we conduct surveys, across our regional command here to understand the perceptions out there, we see a good positive trend that the people see the goodness in their security forces. I think I mentioned that a good number of the people are very, very supportive of the police when they are in there doing good stuff.

They want to be governed, they want to be secured by their own people. I think what we will see is our transition is going to have to be matched to that. So as the Afghan National Security capabilities increase, then we can start to remove some of our resources. But certainly key to keeping the Afghan Security Forces moving in a positive direction is to ensure we have the right leadership here; we have the right headquarters that are supporting them, that are providing the mentoring to them; and then providing the enabling capabilities - air, medevac, other things that they may need until they are able to stand up on their own.

So we don't have a timetable here in Regional Command East and I haven't heard one expressed to me by any of the local officials or elders that I visited throughout our area.

MODERATOR: Okay General, at least in view of the time that we still have for this... I think we have time for one more final round. So Brooks?

Q: Brooks Tigner, Jane's. I'm going to bring you back down to equipment and capability again and this time my question is about the 21st century soldier concept. This goes by a variety of different names, but you know what it means - to equip soldiers, give soldiers a lot of equipment, high level of protection, networked et cetera. The U.S., the U.K. to a certain extent, Canada have poured a lot of research and development into this and I assume that that's being deployed to a certain extent there in Afghanistan. My question is how well is that working? And secondly, are there are any worrisome differences in capability among the foot soldiers - for instance between U.S. forces and those of Poland. Poland doesn't have the defence resources to equip all of its soldiers with this very sophisticated networked capability. Is the U.S. giving them that or are there any operational problems?

Thank you.

VOTEL: Thanks. Well with regards to the last part of your question there, there certainly are some arrangements in between the government of the United States and the government of Poland to provide some capabilities to them. We do that to them. We want them to have the same capabilities that we have to the extent that they can be provided to them. It's in our interest. It's in the interest of the Afghan people to make sure that all of our ISAF soldiers here are outfitted to the best capability we have.

With regards to the first part of your question and some of the initiatives, the technology, other things, I see these all as very, very positive things. Not all of these things I'm sure that we try to do and experiment with will come to fruition, but some of them will and some of them will enhance how our soldiers operate on the battlefield.

Just take one area - communications. We've got very good communications capabilities out there. We have young soldiers who have the capability because they have the means right available to them built into their gear, very compact, to communicate with aircraft overhead, with headquarters that are miles and miles away, or with the squad or team that's to their left and right. So those are huge capabilities.

We have the ability through GPS tracking to know where our elements are all the time. That helps in the co-ordination while Afghanistan has some vast expanses here, and a lot of the areas we operate in are very rugged terrain. So being able to know where our helicopters are, where are forces on the ground are, with accuracy, is very, very important to ensuring we provide the right support to them and have a good read on the situation.

So I think there's a lot of very good progress being made. Certainly I know within my own country's capabilities we do not try to spare expense at the behest of our soldiers. We try to give them the things they need, whether it's clothing, whether it's equipment, whether it's weapons, communications gear, night vision devices, the things that they need in a manner that is useful to them. In some cases we're going to experiment with things and it's not going to work very well and then we'll get rid of that and we'll go back to the drawing board.

So I think we've got a very good approach to that. We're making progress and it's helping soldiers on the ground.

Q: General you mentioned several times the co-operation with the Afghan National Army. As far as I understand, there in the eastern region it's where that co-operation and where the Afghans have become most advanced in leading their own operations. I just wondered if you could first of all characterize the progress that you've seen over the past year with regard to the Afghan forces. And secondly, what more needs to be done? What should the Allies be doing now to improve their training, improve their liaison with the Afghan forces?

VOTEL: Just to kind of characterize the progress that I've seen over the last 10 months or so, we've gone I think from operations where we were... where ISAF forces were clearly leading, calling the shots, determining the objectives, the goals that we were trying to achieve on the ground and moving along and doing that with partnered Afghan forces, where they were acting in concert to us.

Most recently the operation that we have going on right now in Paktika province is being led by Major General Halik, the Core Commander of the 203rd. That operation really was conceived by him. It focused on some military and specific objectives that he wanted to achieve in a portion of his area of responsibility. His staff took the lead in the planning of this; his staff took the lead in coordinating a joint rehearsal with all forces that were involved and he is commanding the operation today.

What it required on our behalf or ISAF forces, I think, is enabling them, providing them the capability, in order to go from those two points that I've tried to outline for you there. There's been a lot of good efforts by the training command here to help with mentoring that leadership and there's been a lot of very good efforts by the ISAF forces out there to partner with them; to show them how to do planning, to let them use some of our automation systems to help do their planning, to show them some of the techniques that we have learned throughout our training and let them apply it.

So to some extent you have to subordinate yourself to the Afghan leadership, the legitimate Afghan leadership and let them take the lead. Mistakes are going to be made. They are always going to be made and then be there to help coach and mentor as necessary. But in our view, as we look at the Core Commander I cited, the Brigade Commanders out there, we see some very good Afghan leadership that's very, very capable of stepping up and taking responsibility for their actions.

So I think it's a case of getting them out front, coaching them on good techniques to use, and then letting them fly a little bit. In most cases they have really stood up to the capability and stood up to the task at hand.

Q: General, there have been reports of local warlords or figures of authority in the north stockpiling weapons, arguing they need protection for the growing encroachments of the Taliban. Is this a problem that you're familiar with in the east?

Thank you.

VOTEL: It has not been a particular problem here. Certainly the types of discussions you're talking about are the tribal nature of the area in which we operate in. There are some tribal leaders who are interested in pursuing the concept of arvakai, local village protectorate organizations. So we do discuss those type of things. Our approach of course is to stay focused on the Afghan National Development Strategy and that calls for the army, for the police, for the border police, to be the legitimate security forces. So that's the direction which we go.

I don't see us having a lot of pressure from any former warlords here in Regional Command East that's causing us to get off that particular track right now.

MODERATOR: Okay General I think we have to stop here in view of the time. Thanks very much for taking your time and doing a big effort in answering all the questions from here. I'm sure we'll see you in the future again in one of these VTC's. On behalf of all the journalists here thanks very much for your time and your frankness and it really gives us a better awareness and knowledge of what's going on in your region.

Thanks very much. If you have some final comments, please go ahead.

VOTEL: Thank you very much. I appreciate that and I appreciate the important role that the media plays in all of our societies and I'm very grateful for the opportunity to talk with you this morning and particular, the European community there. In Regional Command East, as I mentioned, we have the Polish battle group, we have a Turkish PRT here, we have French trainers who are out operating with the Afghan National Army, and very soon the Czech Republic will be putting a provincial reconstruction team here. So we are very grateful for that and they are all great partners and making big contributions here.

I think a lot of the recognition for the success of Regional Command East goes to the Afghan National Security Forces and to the government who are making great strides in trying to improve their capabilities in their concern for their own people. They are taking the lead and we are confident that they are ultimately going to prevail. The troops that we have here both from my own country and the other countries that I've cited are doing a superb job. They are a force for good and we should all be immensely proud of them. We certainly are and I'm very, very glad personally to be in a position of leadership over them.

We think we are making progress here in the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan and particularly in Regional Command East and we think we're going to create a lasting benefit for all the people of Afghanistan. There is a lot of work to be done here. We recognize that. And there can be no timetable for accomplishing each and every task, but every time we do complete a project, every time we do improve security in an area, Afghanistan makes one step closer to being a stable country that can take care of its own people and provide them all the freedoms that they crave and which the enemies that they have would deny them.

So we're very, very glad to be here. Thank you for your time today and for your continued support and interest.

MODERATOR: Thank you. See you next time. Bye.