Turkey   8 July 2008	Global security challenges and NATO’s response by the Chairman of the NATO Military Committee Admiral Giampaolo di Paola at the Silk Road Conference Ladies, Gentlemen, I am delighted to be here today, and to be given the opportunity of talking for a few minutes to give you my perspective of NATO’s role with regard to the current and future security challenges.  I will also, as this is my first opportunity to speak to you as the Chairman of the NATO Military Committee, give you my views on the challenges that we face, because they are inevitably aligned to the global risks and threats.  I intend to keep this introduction short, at the end, I will leave enough time for you to ask questions, if any. Only a few weeks ago, the Secretary General of NATO stood at a Security and Defence Agenda meeting in Brussels and outlined, himself, his view of the major challenges that NATO faces. He noted that there are 5 principal challenges that the world, the International Community and consequently NATO must address in some form or another. I will recall them: Failed States; the growing danger of non-state actors; the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; the growing demands for energy, and finally climate change. Briefly looking at them in turn, we can see why NATO has to take these challenges seriously. Firstly, Failed States.  According to the current ‘failed state index’ of the ‘Foreign Policy’ Journal, there are 32 countries considered as ‘failed states’.  Although that figure is questionable, nevertheless, it provides an indication of the extent of the phenomenon.  And the implications of increasing ungoverned spaces are not going to go easily away, anytime in the future. One could argue that the problem of failed states is not our problem, it doesn’t directly affect us. But these ungoverned spaces can become havens for terrorism, organised crime and other kinds of illicit or illegal activities, which eventually will become a problem for us to face, while the people of those failed states will be forced to break away, often illegally, contributing to illegal immigration and illegal activities.  The parallel issue we should consider is also the increasing gap between the developed and the underdeveloped world.  Failing States often fall into that latter category and there is an increasingly deep global divide between those with good prospects and for those who have few.  That prospects for those without good prospects can drive individuals and groups to extremes of behaviour, or extremes of belief, and in a global world, this is a powerful contributing factor in the next area of concern. Secondly, the increasing power of Non-State Actors.  As we have heard many times before from different authoritative sources, globalisation as a phenomenon has brought incredible  opportunities for economic and social growth but not to all, generating a true globalization divide, between a connected core of developed or developing countries and a disconnected gap of poor countries. At the same time, globalisation has also provided greater opportunities to those who wish to use its power against institutions.  The Internet, reaching inside almost all business and governments, and increasing numbers of individual homes is a great tool but it can be a terrifying weapon.  Witness the Cyber Attacks against Estonia last year and see the potential for non-military action. In the globalized civilization we live in, Non-State actors are becoming more and more a powerful driver for global instability and insecurity. And they can also explain the third challenge: WMD proliferation. We have to be aware of the potential for the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.  We have all shared the concerns over the risk for increased proliferation of military nuclear technology.  We cannot deny that globalisation and the expanding markets drive greater demand for energy in the civilian world and the use of nuclear energy for civilian purposes is one form of response to satisfy this growing energy demand, but an uncontrolled development of inappropriate nuclear technologies could lead to highly destructive weapons falling into the wrong hands.  Let’s not forget either that Weapons of Mass destruction are not only nuclear in nature.  Radiological, Biological and Chemical weapons are also a real danger, as is the issue of missile technology proliferation. And the third challenge leads us to the fourth one. The growing demand for Energy.  We have seen in recent weeks the increasing concern over fuel prices. The dynamic economies of China, India and other Asian countries are developing faster and faster.  They need energy to maintain that development, but the world’s production is not yet meeting that requirement.  Energy, food and other raw materials prices are on the rise, creating a greater need for commodities that can be used as a bargaining tool in negotiations.  Their availability can even be threatened by some of the terrorists and non-state actors I mentioned earlier.  In Iraq, the Militant Forces opposing the Iraqi Government, just to make an example, have frequently targeted the oil production capability to harm progress in that nation.  West African oil is continually under pressure by groups trying to pursue, through violence, a different agenda. The final point is Climate Change, thoroughly connected with the energy challenge. I will not pretend that NATO has the power to do something about the Climate that belongs to a far greater power.  But the impact of climate change is something that we must not ignore, both from a world citizen perspective and from NATO military perspective.  We have seen dramatic natural events, such as Hurricane Katrina and the floods across Europe and Asia.  Not all can be directly attributed to climate change, but there are links.  Competition for resources, particularly water, has the significant potential for generating friction between states.  NATO has responded when it can in the past; we need to be ready for the future. So, where is NATO headed?  Firstly the challenges that we face are not going away, they are evolving and we need to be able to answer those challenges.  They are certainly not only military in nature, let me add not primarily military in nature, on the contrary, they go well beyond the military dimension, but they have profound military implications on the way we prepare for and run future operations. So, how and what we do to contribute to match these challenges?  First, NATO’s current business agenda has to be continued.  There is no doubt that there are some tough topics that need to be firmly tackled.  Afghanistan, Kosovo, Maritime Situational Awareness, Energy Security, Cyber Security, Transformation and development of new expeditionary network-enabled capabilities, to name a few.  These difficult issues will continue to challenge us but they need to be addressed and resolved.  In the end, a lot depends of the manner in which NATO carries out its business, and for what concerns the Military Committee, my direct area of responsibility, it is essential to be capable of making decisions and providing timely, professional, unfettered military advice to the North Atlantic Council.  Nothing else but this will define its real role and relevance in NATO.  If the Military Committee is seen as indecisive, or only capable of severely diluted advice, there is a real chance that it could be sidelined… properly, let me add. So, picking up on our existing work, and to outline my thoughts, there are three principal areas that I believe we will need to focus on. Firstly, operations will remain our number one focus.  Our military forces will continue to serve proudly and bravely in difficult circumstances and I salute their sacrifice and commitment.  However, if we wish to have our publics alongside us, supporting us, during those difficult moments, then the manner in which we shape our operations needs to be very carefully managed. If NATO wishes to remain legitimate, then we must operate legitimately, and to be perceived to do so; therefore in countering the threats I outlined we need to be responsive, but remain responsible.  If we want to retain the legitimate use of force we must use force legitimately. The use of force will be proper remembering that we operate amongst the people, not against the people. The Comprehensive Approach is all about intelligent application of our capabilities in all we do. This means using all strategic lines of operation where and as appropriate; the politicians have the lead here, and have a responsibility to provide clear unambiguous guidance to us, so that we can best do our work. In the operational theatres, very often the opponent is part of the society that we need to stabilise, therefore classic military concepts need to be revolutionised to accommodate highly complex cultural differences.  This is where the Effects Based Approach to Operations is critical to the development of our strategic aims.  All parts of society need to come together to find the solution. Our operations in Afghanistan are top of our priority list and with over 50,000 troops under the NATO umbrella we are making a difference.  But we have to maintain our commitment to that nation, and the military activity must be complemented by a robust international civilian contribution on the part of nations and organisations. Kosovo is not yet clear of the troubles that it has suffered over many years.  But the Balkans, in general, have made immense strides forward in transforming from a region that has been a net importer of security resources, to being a contributing exporter of security.  Many Balkan nations now have forces on operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, which is a true indication of the progress we have made together. Kosovo is one area where we must work with the EU and the International Community to achieve and consolidate a stable solution that meets the needs of all Kosovars and of the neighbouring nations.  Peace and stability has to be a collective effort on all our parts, and one which is driven by the need to develop the regional economies.  We, the military have to help create the environment for that to happen. We had great successes, and should not let those successes be drowned by the bad news.  Our Strategic Communications forms an equally critical part of that armoury; we must tell the world what we are doing coherently, clearly and quickly. We have not being good at it. We must learn how to do it better. Proper strategic communications are as important as operations. The second area is Transformation.  We all have our own understanding of what Transformation means to the Alliance.  In addition to our internal adjustments, I consider that the development of NATO’s new capabilities and new concepts is the key issue to be able to run future missions effectively, but in pursuing them we can not be divorced from our work with Partners and other international players, who will become more and more crucial to our success.  Equally, we must acknowledge that our operations are driving, through necessity, our transformation; interoperability becomes a key in ensuring that our partners are able to develop and operate with us. The increasing capabilities of the European Union have to be taken into account in our plans.  We can not allow NATO and EU development and structures to diverge, especially as so many of the NATO nations and European Union nations are one and the same.  We do not have adequate resources to take our rightful place on the international stage unless we are pragmatic and flexible.  This means taking brave decisions, and working closely in co-operation both within NATO and the EU. Our transformational programmes are producing results, and what I am pleased about is that the culture of transformation is gaining a foothold.  I am seeing evidence of it in the nations.  In many more of our activities we are asking how we can be more effective and efficient.  There is no doubt that we must work on our expeditionary posture, greater joinery in operations across the whole Alliance, effective expeditionary capabilities, exploiting information technologies, but in today’s  operational environment the most critical aspect is better civil-military co-operation capabilities.  NATO is challenging some of the basic rules and structures that have become obsolete and no longer appropriate for NATO.  The ongoing Command Structure Review is an example. It is not an easy exercise and shows us challenges, I will not hide that from you, but there is a real need and desire to arrive at consensus, a qualitative consensus not a diluted one. On the practical front, Centres of Excellence, such as the Cyber Defence facility that has been developed in Tallinn, in Estonia, are additional examples of how NATO is preparing for and addressing the challenges that I have outlined. The third area is our co-operation with other states and international actors.  In addition to the EU, we have also to further listen to our friends.  The MD and ICI nations that support us in many ways look at the world differently and we must embrace their differences and understand and take care of their concerns.  The partnership and co-operative programmes run by the NATO Defence College, to cite one example, will be a key in developing those relationships in a way that supports our capabilities, but also helps those nations become firm allies in our defence against the threats that face us. Beyond the Alliance, we are seeing a global effort in support of our operations.  Australia, New Zealand and Japan have all committed resources, and in many cases forces to our operations.  There is no geographic limit to terrorism, or the threats and the challenges that we face, so our response must be able to accommodate being an Alliance with global partners. Russia is an essential player for global security. We should not forget that Russia is still trying to find its place in the new world; we can humbly be part of the solution, rather than perpetuate the problems that seem to be difficult to remove.  I believe that the Military to Military co-operation has shown a way forward for us.  The presence of Russian ships on Operation ACTIVE ENDEAVOUR last year is testimony to the progress we have made.  Precisely when political dialogue is encountering difficulties, our military co-operation can be a solid foundation to maintain ties of trust. I said that I would give you an opportunity to ask me questions at the end, and I intend to keep that promise.  We have much on the NATO agenda to tackle and, for some issues, time is running short; this will require flexibility from all of us.  It is a continuation of the work that we have been addressing for nearly 60 years now.  In 60 years, we have achieved a great deal, but let’s not forget that in 60 years an organisation can also accumulate a lot of bad habits.  We should not be afraid of changing what needs to be changed because evolution and adaptation is part of the inherent nature of human processes and structures. It has always been so in the past and it continues to be so in the present and for the future. What we address in the years to come requires vision, and courage, and will be pivotal to the direction that NATO takes for the future. We have the 60th Anniversary Summit in Strasbourg and Kehl next year.  That will be a landmark event in so many ways; we have a dynamic Alliance, and an equally dynamic agenda. I intend to do my part working hard with the Military Committee agenda and the Strategic Commanders to continue our efforts to address the global challenges I outlined at the start of my presentation, in delivering a NATO military component that is: Effective now, forward looking, responsive and responsible to-day and tomorrow. Thank you, I will happily take any questions that you may have.