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| Updated: 14-jul-08 | NATO IMS Speech |
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Turkey
7 July 2008 |
Speech Ladies, Gentlemen, thank you for the opportunity to say a few words on the Balkan security from a NATO perspective. There is no doubt that when we talk about the Balkans today, we are inevitably drawn to Kosovo and the situation there. That tendency must not mask the real changes that have taken place in the whole region. COMJFC Naples will discuss the changing nature of the security situation in the Balkans, but I would remind you that it was not that long ago that the region was on fire and we had far wider conflicts to address, first in Bosnia then in Kosovo. Only a month ago, the Deputy Secretary General of NATO, spoke in Slovenia on the subject of the security situation in the Balkans. It is worth me covering some of the points that he raised, because it will put what I would like to say about the Balkans into context. We have made amazing progress in this region over the past decade. NATO has played a critical role in that transformation. The break up of Yugoslavia in the early 90’s, and the conflicts that ensued were difficult times for the region and for its neighbours. But we got through them. NATO’s engagement with forces became substantial after the Dayton Agreement in 1995. Since then, NATO has overseen, and facilitated an incredible change in the Balkans. the key to this was the adoption of a more comprehensive regional approach which eventually led to the European Union taking the lead in Bosnia and now is moving in to play a major role in Kosovo. Within the logic of this comprehensive approach, NATO has continued to support the EU and UN missions. Our successes in countries such as Bosnia & Herzegovina are viewed as templates to be applied to other demanding crises. That template included the United Nations, the European Union and the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe working together in the Balkans. That very template helped defuse a growing crisis in the Former Republic of Macedonia1 in 2001. Now, we look at Skopje and we see one of the Balkans nations that have moved forward at an incredible pace. The Balkans are unrecognisable from the region of only a few years ago. Now, we have two nations, Albania and Croatia2, invited to join NATO; they plan formally to become members at the 60th Anniversary Summit in Germany and France in 2009. Potentially a third, The Former Yugoslavian Republic of Macedonia, has been told at Bucharest that the same invitation is ready to be made once the issue over the name is resolved. Others in this audience, Serbia, Bosnia & Herzegovina and Montenegro have joined the Partnership for Peace programme. Now that the Balkan region is composed of NATO and PfP members, we need to address the issues differently. However, recent events related to Kosovo, and the uncertainty that surrounds them, can not be ignored. We can not deny that when you turn on the television or radio, events in Afghanistan seem to dominate. The world is focussed on that region, but it is worth me highlighting NATO’s continued and unwavering commitment to the Balkans. Overall, we have nearly 70,000 forces deployed under NATO’s command throughout the world. In Afghanistan, where we have over 50,000 forces, that represents over 70% of our deployed effort. However, the Balkans, including Kosovo, accounts for some 20% of our total worldwide forces. The figure for NATO and allied forces is some 15,000, which is a clear demonstration of our commitment to assist the region in its aspirations and progress towards Euro-Atlantic integration. If we exclude Kosovo itself, the actual numbers of NATO and allied forces present in the Balkans is, however, very small indeed3 and, again, this reflects the changed nature of the situation in the Balkans and its evolution towards Euro-Atlantic partnership and membership, which no longer require, with the exception of Kosovo, large military forces on the ground, but rather experts advisory teams and military assistance missions. We can not deny that the situation in Kosovo still retains a disruptive potential which could negatively impact on regional co-operation if not handled sensitively and comprehensively. As reiterated by NATO Heads of State and Governments at Bucharest last April, KFOR will remain in Kosovo on the basis of UNSCR 1244 to ensure a safe and secure environment, including freedom of movement for all people in Kosovo, unless the UNSC decides otherwise. Therefore NATO and KFOR will continue to work with the Authorities in Kosovo and, bearing in mind its operational mandate, KFOR will cooperate with and assist the UN, EU and other international actors, as appropriate, to support the development of a stable, democratic, multiethnic and peaceful Kosovo. Furthermore in his letter dated 12 June 2008, the UN Secretary General, reaffirming the validity of UNSCR 1244, noted that the political development that took place in Kosovo on 17 February and 15 June 2008, taken together were contributing to a substantial change in Kosovo and stated, on the basis of this changed reality on the ground and in absence of any other guidance from UNSC, his intention to reconfigure the structure and profile of the international security presence to one that corresponds to the evolving situation in Kosovo and that enables the EU to assume an enhanced operational role in Kosovo in accordance with UNSCR 1244. The reconfiguration of UNMIK presence in Kosovo and the enhanced role of the EU EULEX Mission will evolve in the weeks and months to come. Although not everything is clear at this stage, what it is clear is that EU is on the way to assume a growing role in Kosovo. We must acknowledge that there are sensitivities on the part of all ethnicities within Kosovo; those concerns have to be addressed by the international community. We recognise that parallel structures in Northern Kosovo, by Kosovo-Serbs, are not, and would not make the situation easier. In this respect, the Assembly of the Community of Municipalities of Kosovo is a negative development, potentially escalating the establishment of parallel structures. There have, nonetheless, been relatively few significant incidents that NATO and its allies in Kosovo have had to handle. We must, however, not discount that the cumulative effect of minor interethnic incidents could eventually heighten tensions in Kosovo. On a positive note, we look with favour at Serbia’s aspirations for Euro-Atlantic integration. In this respect, the recent signing of the ASA agreement with the EU, as well as the ongoing work towards an Individual Partnership Programme since it joined the NATO Partnership for Peace programme in December 2006 are good initial steps in this process. It am hopeful, therefore, that Serbia’s long-term strategic interests will favour a fruitful co-operation with its neighbours and NATO in the region. A stable and prosperous Balkans region cannot be pursued without a stable and prosperous Serbia, at ease with all its neighbours. NATO’s continued engagement with Russia, in this context, must also be considered. We have our own challenges at the political level with Russia, but we also have some excellent examples of the military-to-military co-operation that clearly demonstrates that we are maintaining a positive dialogue with Russia. But in all, the Balkan region has seen a significant improvement becoming a security contributor. As a matter of fact the region has seen an increase in support to NATO operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. For that, I am particularly grateful to the contributing nations, because it demonstrates that our shared values and aspirations can lead to better co-operation and interoperability. So where does that place the Balkans in relation to NATO’s broader strategic considerations? We can not deny that the European Union nations currently committing forces to the Balkans are largely NATO nations as well. So, our ability to generate forces for other operational theatres is constrained by having to get them from the same pot. If we are to address the more global security situation, the solutions must come from a far more comprehensive approach that simply military. The Comprehensive Approach means greater inter-institutional dialogue and engagement. The template that has been established in the Balkans, with the UN, EU and NATO working together, is one that can be used in Afghanistan as well. A stable Balkans means a stable South Eastern Europe, which is in all our strategic interests. This is an integral part of NATO’s strategic vision. I know that General Bentegeat will speak about the civilian-military interface and the potential for progress in the Balkans, but from NATO’s perspective, that Comprehensive Approach involves all our operations theatres. For us, the manner in which we approach the Balkans can not be separated from our operations elsewhere. NATO’s political leaders have already agreed the principles of the Comprehensive Approach to operations. Both Afghanistan and the Balkans require a Comprehensive Approach. In the Balkans, this is happening with increasing links among the NATO-EU-UN. And, this conference is a further example of what the Comprehensive Approach does mean. Regional co-operation is an advanced form of Comprehensive Approach. Through regional co-operation among all its members, the Balkan region can pursue its march towards Euro-Atlantic integration. That perspective is the final end state for a prosperous, peaceful and dynamic Balkan region. NATO, together with the EU and UN is working so that this end state may be achieved in a hopefully not too distant future. But, in the end, it is up to the Balkan nations to do the job. It is in their (your) strategic interest to make this happen. I am delighted to have been able to say a few words here, to the Chiefs of Defence of the region and urge those working towards membership to maintain their efforts in the Partnership Action Plans, which are at the core of a greater understanding and progress in the region and towards the integration. What I will do now is defer to my European counterpart General Bentegeat and COMJFC Naples Adm Fitzgerald to provide their views. I believe it would be useful to hold questions until the end of our interventions which we can then take together. Thank you.
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