WEBEDITION Vol. 46 - No. 1 Spring 1998 pp. 32-35

The future of NATO's Mediterranean initiative Nicola de Santis NATO Office of Information and Press

(15Kb) The future of NATO's Mediterranean initiative was the subject of a thought-provoking study presented by RAND to the Alliance's top political and military authorities and opinion leaders, as well as to representatives of the six Mediterranean dialogue partner countries, at a high-level conference in Rome last November. Co-sponsored by NATO and the Centro Militare di Studi Strategici in Rome, the conference was opened by Italian Prime Minister Romano Prodi. NATO Secretary General Javier Solana gave the keynote address, with Italian Defence Minister Beniamino Andreatta, Deputy Secretary General of NATO Ambassador Sergio Balanzino and Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) General Wesley Clark among other eminent participants. In this article, Nicola de Santis, Liaison Officer Italy and Officer for Southern and Eastern Mediterranean countries at NATO, and coordinator of the conference, highlights the issues raised and some of the proposals put forward in Rome. Crown Prince Hassan of Jordan (left) arriving at NATO headquarters for discussions with Secretary General Javier Solana. NATO photo (26Kb) NATO has concentrated much of its efforts over the last decade on projecting stability in Central and Eastern Europe. As the new democracies in the east become increasingly stable and begin to integrate into the Euro-Atlantic institutions, NATO will need to shift its attention to where its most pressing security challenges are likely to lie, on its southern periphery. This is the premise of an authoritative study by four senior analysts at RAND, the American think-tank, commissioned by the Italian Ministry of Defence and presented to NATO's top political and military authorities, as well as to representatives of the Mediterranean dialogue countries, the European Union, Western European Union and the North Atlantic Assembly, in November 1997. (1) According to this study, the Mediterranean region has acquired increasing strategic importance in recent years, and in the context of growing instability in the southern and eastern Mediterranean, NATO's vital security interests may be affected. A number of policy proposals and prescriptions are therefore offered to bolster NATO's budding Mediterranean initiative with the six non-NATO Mediterranean dialogue partner countries Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Mauritania, Morocco and Tunisia. Underlying factors of Mediterranean security The RAND analysts have rightly moved away from the common tendency to treat the Mediterranean region as an "arc of conflict" and a hot bed of tension. Indeed such a simplistic characterisation does not accurately describe the problems of the region and puts too much emphasis on the "hard" military aspects of security in the area. On the contrary, they point out that problems in the region are shaped more by political upheaval and socio-economic pressures, and by accompanying instability and tension. The political turmoil in these societies can be attributed to the difficulty in reconciling, on the one hand, the development of religious, cultural and economic pluralism and the emergence of a more active civil society, with, on the other hand, the demands that this poses in terms of civil rights, accountability, transparency and questions of political succession. Consequently, even considering the growth of violent radical movements, for the majority of the countries of the southern and eastern Mediterranean, security is more of a question of internal stability than a military matter. Moreover, the instability deriving from socio-economic imbalances can have a direct impact, in the form of "soft" security problems, on the vital interests and well-being of the European member countries of NATO. The problem threatens to become urgent in the face of a North African population expected to grow from about 63 million today to some 142 million by 2025, and the enormous implications that this will have on employment, housing, sanitation, food, water, transportation and communication systems in the region. What is more, some 30 per cent of the area's population will be under 15 years of age. In the same period, the population of the southern European members of NATO is only expected to grow by five million. It was pointed out at the conference that this demographic imbalance is likely to result in massive flows of migration towards southern Europe in the 21st century. This has social and domestic security ramifications for the countries of Europe which are ill-prepared to absorb large influxes of immigrants. Moreover, despite efforts to restrict illegal immigration, it is becoming increasingly difficult to stop desperate migrants seeking better opportunities abroad as recent events in Italy have shown. Developments in the south-eastern Mediterranean can also directly affect the stability and well-being of European members of the Alliance through disruption of energy imports and trade. Much of Europe's energy supplies are imported from the region: 65 per cent of its oil and natural gas imports pass through the Mediterranean on approximately 3,000 ships daily; 30 per cent of Italy's oil is imported from Libya and 32 per cent of its natural gas from Algeria; France, Germany, Greece, Spain, Turkey and the United Kingdom all import oil from Libya, while Algerian natural gas is exported to Belgium, France, Portugal and Spain; 74 per cent of Spain's natural gas needs, 50 per cent of Italy's and 29 per cent of France's were imported from the Maghreb states in 1996. Trade in the other direction amounted to US$6 billion in European exports to Algeria in 1996, or 67 per cent of its imports; with 69 percent of Tunisia's imports, 66 percent of Libya's and 57 percent of Morocco's also coming from Europe in 1996. While not posing a military threat, this interdependence has clear security implications for the Alliance. NATO has already adopted a broad approach to security, defining it in terms more comprehensive than merely military risks. Yet the socio-economic developments referred to above may lead to the Alliance's definition of security being subject to further refinement for some years to come. This is the logic behind the approach taken by RAND's research which calls on NATO to improve cooperation with its Mediterranean dialogue partner countries, starting with "soft" security issues. This is not to say that "hard" security issues, such as the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, are not significant. On the contrary, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction in the Mediterranean will not only have direct implications on the security of NATO member countries in the coming years, but could also have destabilising effects in the region itself by altering the strategic balance. There is common interest, therefore, in eventual cooperation in this field between NATO and its Mediterranean dialogue partners, consistent with NATO's objective of preventing through diplomatic means the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery. A coherent Mediterranean policy Three diplomats from Austria, Great Britain and Luxembourg (left to right) on an EU mission to Algeria, talking to the press on arrival at the airport in Algiers on 19 January. Reuters (53Kb) The RAND team argues that the issue is not whether NATO should have a Mediterranean strategy, but what the goals and content of that strategy should be and how it can be most effectively implemented. Broad consensus emerged at the Rome conference that NATO needs to engage in a proactive policy in the Mediterranean, since growing instability in the south will inevitably affect its interests in the future, as the distinction between Mediterranean and European security becomes increasingly vague. The emerging challenges accompanying change in the Mediterranean region require a concerted approach on the part of the myriad European initiatives aimed at the area. Better coordination between them, particularly between the two main initiatives, those of the European Union and of NATO, is essential to ensure that their approaches are complementary and mutually reinforcing. The RAND research suggests that in order to minimise the potential for overlap and duplication, each institution should concentrate on what it does best. Problems in the region of a socio-economic nature, for example, would be better handled in the EU forum. The study points out that the EU's Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, launched in Barcelona in November 1995, and NATO's Mediterranean dialogue, are complementary since they address different aspects of the same issues. The research proposes the establishment of institutional ties between NATO and the European Union, in order to better develop synergy and cooperation between the initiatives of the two organisations. These ties might begin with a periodical exchange of views between the Secretary General of NATO and the President of the EU Commission and the Commissioners concerned with the Mediterranean, enabling the two institutions to keep abreast of their respective activities. Working-level ties between the secretariats of the two institutions should also be enhanced to ensure the success of this endeavour. Public perceptions and policy options Attitudes towards NATO in the southern and eastern Mediterranean are quite different from those in Central and Eastern Europe, where there is strong support for NATO. In the southern and eastern Mediterranean countries, where little is known about the Alliance's adaptation over the past several years, NATO is perceived widely as a Cold War institution searching for a new enemy. That is why the best course to change the perception of NATO in these countries is to focus more on "soft" security, building mutual understanding and confidence before engaging in "hard" military cooperation. Measures should be developed with the aim of promoting transparency and defusing threat perceptions, and promoting a better understanding of NATO's policies and objectives. Three priority areas identified by RAND to this end include: Public information NATO information activities can represent an important tool for promoting dialogue, understanding and confidence-building. This implies organising more international conferences and seminars discussing NATO's agenda and Mediterranean security issues, and increasing and strengthening ties with research and defence institutions in Mediterranean dialogue countries. The number of visits to NATO by key opinion leaders from dialogue countries should also be increased, targeting journalists, parliamentarians, academics and emerging leaders in key sectors of these countries. Other recommendations include publishing some NATO materials in Arabic, granting fellowships to researchers from dialogue states, and increasing port calls in dialogue countries by STANAVFORMED ships, as well as developing a coordinated public information effort for these visits. Civil emergency planning Increasing the participation of dialogue states in Alliance civil emergency planning (CEP) activities and related courses at the NATO School in Oberammergau is also recommended. Cooperation in CEP can serve as a confidence-building measure and lay the groundwork for cooperation in other areas. Crisis management and peacekeeping Cooperation in peacekeeping, crisis management and peace support activities should also be increased, building on the participation of Egypt, Jordan and Morocco in SFOR in Bosnia-Herzegovina, while expanding opportunities to take part in peacekeeping courses at Oberammergau. Dialogue countries could also be invited to send observers to peacekeeping and other NATO exercises as well as to send officers to special briefings at SHAPE on crisis management, peacekeeping and peace support. These activities could be the first steps toward developing, in the future, some degree of military cooperation in the fields of crisis management, peace support, or military exercises. This cooperation should be tailored to the specific needs of each dialogue partner. The broader agenda NATO Secretary General Solana (left) and Italian Minister of Defence Beniamino Andreatta during the press conference following the Rome Conference last November. AP (34Kb) Before any of this can happen, however, the conference concluded that NATO must recognise the importance of Mediterranean security in its broader agenda and undertake measures to increase the level of cooperation with the Mediterranean dialogue countries. This will demand increased resources. While the formula of self-funding could apply to a limited number of activities, to ensure broad participation and the success of the wide array of activities described above, NATO has to allocate increased financial resources for this purpose. To this end it is encouraging to see that the Rome conference was not only instrumental in widening understanding of the Mediterranean dimension as an integral part of the European security architecture, but also in increasing awareness of the need to allocate increased resources in 1998 to conduct activities in the fields of information, civil emergency planning and scientific and environmental affairs, in order to reach out more effectively to dialogue countries. The conference also stimulated ideas for a coherent, future-oriented Mediterranean policy. It highlighted how NATO information activities can support the Alliance's policy making process, bringing important opinion leaders together from Alliance and dialogue countries, and sharing knowledge and expertise. The work to be undertaken by NATO's Mediterranean Cooperation Group (MCG) in 1998 is particularly important in this regard. With overall responsibility for the initiative, the MCG is now moving the dialogue forward into actual cooperation. The Mediterranean dialogue is already contributing to confidence-building and cooperation in the region, while complementing other international efforts. Its enhancement is a logical response to the changing security landscape in Europe. Footnotes "NATO's Mediterranean Initiative: Policy issues and dilemmas", by Stephen Larrabee, Jerrold Green, Ian Lesser and Michele Zanini. Prepared for the Italian Ministry of Defence by RAND, September 1997.