WEB EDITION No. 2 - Mar 1995 Vol. 43 - pp.7-10	The WEU and NATO: prospects for a more balanced relationship Hans Van Mierlo, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands
	Both NATO and WEU can play a major role in integrating Central and Eastern Europe into Western security structures, a process that must include the establishment of adequate relations with such Partner countries as Russia and Ukraine. These developments will have consequences for relations among the European countries themselves and for transatlantic relations. The Europeans, while believing that the continued involvement of the US and Canada remains imperative, want to do more to ensure their own security and are seeking to strengthen the European pillar of the Alliance by increasing European operational capabilities. This new equilibrium between the European and American pillars may need to be expressed by means of an "Atlantic Contract" which could transcend the borders of politico-military cooperation, taking in other elements of the broad range of shared strategic interests. While the Netherlands has been an active member of the Western European Union (WEU) since its inception, holding the WEU Presidency provides a special opportunity to be more closely involved in the work of the organization. We have just completed our term of the Presidency which covered the second half of 1994, and have passed this responsibility to our Portuguese friends, who are now holding the Presidency for the first time. I would like to explain in some detail where we stand with regard to the WEU and to contemplate its future, focusing in particular on its relations with NATO. Let me start with some observations on the evolving security configuration in Europe. The design of the European security structure is a matter of prime importance as it lies at the heart of European security. It constitutes an intricate framework in which the different players in the European security field are carefully positioned, so that any change must be a matter of close consideration. The issue is currently very much at the top of the international agenda, particularly since open discussion on increasing the membership of Western European security institutions began. On the security path, a first important step was made at the NATO Summit of January 1994, where we reaffirmed that NATO remains open to the membership of other European countries, and where we launched the Partnership for Peace, inviting partners to join us in new political and military efforts to work alongside the Alliance. Last December, we made the prospects of membership more concrete by initiating a NATO study on the way in which NATO will enlarge, the principles which will guide this process and the implications of membership. At the economic and political level, the European Union has created the prospect of integration for a number of Central European and Baltic countries, which have concluded or are about to conclude "Europe Agreements". It is important that these integration processes run in parallel, because economic, political and military integration are closely linked and, in fact, are becoming practically indivisible. In this respect, the politically delicate question of whether candidate countries will accede individually or in successive batches will have to be given due consideration. These growing prospects of integration will, no doubt, enhance the feeling of security in candidate member states and contribute to reassuring constituencies in these countries that the path their governments have chosen, i.e., towards integration in Western European structures, is the right one. However, it is also becoming evident that the processes of integration, notably the enlargement of NATO, can only be successful - i.e., contribute to increased security and stability in the whole of Europe - if accompanied by the establishment of adequate relations with Russia, Ukraine and, as appropriate, Belarus. We should make use of bilateral and multilateral channels to include these countries in our networks. I am thinking here of the Partnership and Cooperation Agreements with the European Union, of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC), Partnership for Peace and the "enhanced dialogue" between Russia and NATO, which should evolve into fully fledged cooperation with Russia. Also, better use could be made of the regional and sub-regional approaches offered by the OSCE. (1) The recent move by Russia to initiate discussion within the OSCE on a European Security Model for the 21st century, provides an opportunity for our active and open-minded participation. Against this background, we should vigorously pursue our efforts to convince Russia that the enlargement of NATO (or, for that matter, the European Union and the WEU) is not directed against other countries. In this respect, NATO should attempt, notably in Russia, to correct its distorted public image with the population and authorities by setting up a NATO information office. Furthermore, I believe that it will be very much in the interest of the Central European and Baltic candidates for membership to establish intensive and transparent neighbourly relations with Russia, Ukraine and Belarus. In short, we must convince these three countries that "new dividing lines", if they are perceived as such, represent merely different shades of integration that do not preclude closer cooperation now nor even closer arrangements in the future. Our approach is inclusive, not exclusive. The WEU and Central and Eastern Europe Both NATO and the WEU have a task to fulfil when it comes to facilitating the smooth integration of Central and Eastern European countries into Western security structures. As far as the WEU is concerned, during the Dutch Presidency substance was given to the status of "Associate Partner" which was offered to nine Central European and Baltic countries at the Kirchberg Ministerial meeting in Luxembourg last May. And I believe that we achieved some notable results during the WEU Ministerial Council, held in Noordwijk, the Netherlands, the following November. First, at Noordwijk we launched a "wide-ranging reflection" on the new security conditions in Europe with the participation of the Associate Partners. This might in time lead to the drawing up of a White Paper on European security, as suggested by France. It is the first opportunity for these countries to have a direct influence on the formulation of elements of a European security policy, and this process should bring about common security perceptions leading to a gradual alignment of our respective security orientations. Secondly, we endorsed a document containing preliminary conclusions on the formulation of a Common European Defence Policy (CEDP). This document is only a beginning as it seeks to provide a basis for further work in shaping a European defence policy. The paper sets out the scope and objectives of such a policy, and it enumerates a number of elements of a CEDP - the acquis as it were - which have already been developed in the WEU, in the European Union and in NATO. From this basis, the document identifies a number of areas which should be developed with some urgency in order for the WEU to evolve into a flexible and operational security organization, capable of rapid response. The bulk of the document is therefore devoted to measures designed to strengthen the operational role of the WEU. In this context, the elaboration of the Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTFs) concept is considered of crucial importance. The Associate Partners were kept informed of progress during different stages in the formulation of the document, and they participated in the final deliberations. Thirdly, we discussed at Noordwijk the possibility of drawing the Central European and Baltic countries into the operational activities of the WEU. Offers from these countries will now be considered, on a case by case basis, for inclusion in the deployment and rotation plans. This opens up wider opportunities for these countries to participate in the non-Article V tasks of the WEU, also known as "Petersberg tasks", such as humanitarian operations, peacekeeping and crisis management. I see this as a useful effort by the WEU to complement the activities performed by NATO in the framework of the Partnership for Peace. Finally, the WEU is presently discussing options to forge stronger ties with Russia and Ukraine. It may be expected that we will soon have regular and intensified contacts with both these countries, amounting to substantive security dialogues on issues of common concern. Relations between NATO and the WEU In my view, Europe should take a larger share of responsibility for its own security and the security of its allies. Europe should continue progressively to develop a European defence policy that ensures commensurate European participation in collective defence, and an active engagement in conflict prevention and crisis management in Europe and elsewhere. It is the logical way forward in view of the new security conditions in Europe and the economic and political weight this continent represents in international relations. These conditions justify a new assessment of the interpretation of burden sharing. The objective of creating a fair internal balance in the Alliance was in fact also laid down in the Declaration of the January 1994 NATO Summit, where it addresses the development of the European Security and Defence Identity and the WEU as the means to strengthen the European pillar of the Alliance. An important condition for creating this new balance is the enhancement of the WEU's operational capabilities. The WEU, or "coalitions of the willing" within WEU (possibly including non-member states), should be capable of carrying out operations related to security in Europe and to the protection of its interests elsewhere. Clearly, the most cost-effective way to do so is through the implementation of the concept of Combined Joint Task Forces, which would allow for a flexible use of the NATO Integrated Military Structure and other, national capabilities. The WEU has already given its views on the CJTF concept and I hope we can expect satisfactory progress in the elaboration of the concept by May 1995 at the North Atlantic Council meeting at Noordwijk. In my view, the solution of the CJTF question is not only decisive for a credible operational role for the WEU and NATO itself, but also a test case for NATO-WEU relations. Much of the above suggests that the Europeans want to do more to ensure their own security. As I stated earlier, that is part of our objective of strengthening the European pillar of the Alliance by increasing European operational capabilities. It might, however, also suggest that we could easily do without our North American allies. That assumption would be wrong. One of the lessons learned from the international effort in Yugoslavia, is that Europe cannot go it alone. We will definitely continue to need the commitment and support of our transatlantic allies in the maintenance and restoration of peace on our continent and beyond. Both from a political point of view and from the point of view of operational efficacy, the continued involvement of the US and Canada in security matters in and around Europe is imperative. We must, therefore, continue to be able to rely on US and Canadian support. In view, too, of the ongoing political debate in both of these countries on the re-evaluation of North American security interests, Europe can only ensure a continued North American commitment by playing a larger role itself, both in our collective defence and with respect to crisis management operations. Consequently, I believe that the WEU should develop into a stronger operational organization, sufficiently equipped to take immediate action in times of crisis. To this end, the WEU should continue to develop its operational potential, also in the field of joint civil/military operations. The WEU is presently carrying out such operations with respect to the former Yugoslavia, with considerable success. I am referring to the customs mission on the Danube supporting riparian states in the implementation of trade sanctions against Serbia and Montenegro, and the WEU police operation in Mostar. As this type of activity contains non-military components, the WEU is presently considering introducing a mixed civilian/military element into its planning process. In addition to this, at Noordwijk, the WEU took the first step towards the creation of a Humanitarian Task Force that might play a role in rescue and evacuation operations. However, the WEU should also progressively develop capabilities for peacekeeping and more robust crisis management operations, drawing on the Forces Answerable to the WEU (FAWEUs); hence the importance of developing the WEU's operational capabilities hand in hand with the elaboration of the CJTF concept. At the same time, we must continue to strengthen NATO, particularly for the operations it is best equipped to handle, i.e., those at the higher end of the spectrum. Following this complementary approach, both NATO and the WEU should be fully ready to undertake operations individually, jointly or in other ad hoc configurations, depending on the specific circumstances of each case. Workable CJTF arrangements are the key to a flexible and adequate response to crises. Changing the European Union I will confine myself here to a few words on the possible consequences, also for the Alliance, of the forthcoming review in the European Union. In 1996, the review of the Maastricht Treaty on the European Union will be conducted through the Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) and this will have repercussions for the WEU. Furthermore, the WEU itself will be reviewing its own WEU Declaration of Maastricht. Whether the IGC will result in the full integration of the WEU in the EU (as an attachment to the second pillar - Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) - or as a new fourth pillar) remains to be seen. But it is likely that the IGC will lead to some institutionalized form of enhanced integration of the WEU in the European Union. This, clearly, has consequences for the institutional framework of the emerging European Security and Defence Identity, which will then be centred on the new "enhanced European Union". Integration in some form or another of the WEU into the European Union gives rise to various questions: Should there be a WEU-type security guarantee in the revised Maastricht Treaty? If so, how do we solve the question of non-WEU EU members (presently WEU observers)? Or, when it comes to the collective defence of the EU, should we interlock the EU and NATO in a direct manner by referring to the Washington Treaty? If so, how should we deal with states that are members of either the EU or NATO, but not of both? Should there also be a treaty provision on Petersberg tasks, which would entail an extension of the present political solidarity in joint actions in the field of conflict prevention and crisis management to include an explicit treaty-based military dimension? Along the same lines, do we require a treaty basis for Forces Answerable to the European Union (as "successors" to FAWEU)? In fact, the above considerations would imply the development by the European Union of a coherent CFSP and a Common European Defence Policy (CEDP), as referred to in Article J.4 of the Maastricht Treaty. This also raises the issue of the extent to which these policy fields should remain on a strictly consensual basis or whether some refinements may be possible. The further shaping of such a coherent set of policies will not be an easy task. I am thinking here in particular of the position of European but non-EU NATO members, notably Turkey, Norway and Iceland. They are fully involved, through their Associate Member status with the WEU, in the further development of a CEDP in the WEU. With the possibility of the WEU being drawn gradually into the Union, and with the subsequent gradual integration of the Common Foreign and Security Policy and the Common European Defence Policy, their non-participation in the CFSP might make the formulation of these policies quite a challenge. The nine Associate Partners of the WEU from Central Europe and the Baltics can be expected to become progressively involved in the policy-making processes in the WEU, while at the same time having the prospect of full EU membership and, therefore, of participation in the formulation of a CFSP and CEDP in the European Union. Towards a new Atlantic relationship? We have seen that the European security configuration is undergoing a crucial process of reorientation. After the demise of the Warsaw Pact, Western security organizations have embarked on a gradual process of enlargement. This will lead to greater economic and political stabilityments will be of consequence both for relations among the European countries themselves and for transatlantic relations within the Alliance, in other words for the relations between the "enhanced" European Union and the US and Canada. The question arises whether some sort of "Atlantic Contract or Understanding" should be drawn up in order to define the balance between NATO's European and Atlantic pillars, reflecting a new equilibrium within the Alliance. Such an understanding would definitely have to include a provision on the relationship between the guarantees contained in the Washington Treaty and the revised Maastricht Treaty, as referred to above. Furthermore, it should contain arrangements concerning CJTFs, thereby ensuring an operational capability for the "enhanced European Union". A related question is whether, against the background of the new security conditions in Europe after the Cold War, such a contract should be limited to transatlantic security relations only. I am thinking here of the rather provocative but intriguing speech made by Christoph Bertram, Editor-in-Chief of Die Zeit, at the 40th General Assembly of the Atlantic Treaty Association in the Hague on 26 October 1994. His suggestion of broadening the scope of the relations between the European and transatlantic pillars of NATO at this juncture, might be an attractive one. In Bertram's words: "We can no longer afford to leave US-European relations to the ministers of foreign affairs and defence or to the chiefs of staff: we must get the ministers of health, of labour, of social affairs, of the environment together. If the latter have nothing to say to each other, the former will also, sooner rather than later, run out of a common agenda." The Atlantic Contract I referred to could indeed very well transcend the borders of politico-military cooperation and provide a new foundation for broader relations between the European Union and the US and Canada. In view of the vast array of joint strategic interests - of which Bertram names a few important ones - the Atlantic Contract should provide for appropriate venues to give shape to an enhanced transatlantic relationship. While commencing a study to prepare for enlargement at an appropriate time in the future, NATO should reflect on its basic orientations and core structures with a view to establishing a new equilibrium between its European and American components. This would provide an opportunity to give new meaning to NATO's role as the essential forum for consultation among its members and the venue for agreement on policies bearing on the security and defence commitments of Allies under the North Atlantic Treaty. In this connection, an Atlantic Contract could provide the framework for a more comprehensive transatlantic partnership. Footnotes (1) The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) was renamed the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe or OSCE at the recent Budapest meeting. © Copyright by North Atlantic Treaty Organisation 1995.