Header
Updated: 28-Nov-2003 NATO News Articles

Article first
published in
Krasnaya
Zvezda
, a
newspaper
published by the Russian Ministry
of Defence, on
30 Oct. 2003

[Russian]
[English]

NATO's Transformation

Article by NATO Secretary General, Lord Robertson

December 20th , 1991, was a dramatic day in NATO's post-Cold War transformation. During a meeting in Brussels that included NATO and countries across Central and Eastern Europe, the representative of the Soviet Union was asked to take a telephone call. He soon returned to his seat, took the microphone, and announced that the Soviet Union had been dissolved. Henceforth, the delegate said, he would be representing Russia.

For many people, on both sides of the old Cold War divide, the end of the Soviet Union called NATO's future into question. What further purpose could the Alliance serve now that the threat that had brought it into existence had disappeared?

The answer quickly became clear. The post Cold War era posed new challenges to the security and stability of the international community. But security cooperation between trusting partners remained the best way to meet these new challenges and preserve the peace.

NATO's members therefore decided to maintain their cooperation within the Atlantic Alliance. They recognized that the trust, transparency and mutual support built up over 40 years between Europe and North America had the potential to be equally effective in the future as it had in the past.

But the NATO countries also recognised that this had to be a new NATO, focussed firmly on post-Cold War threats and challenges. And they further agreed that cooperation within NATO would no longer suffice. In the face of transnational threats, only the broadest possible cooperation could be effective

NATO's first step, in the early 1990's, came in response to the wish of many new Euro-Atlantic democracies to build closer relations with the Atlantic Alliance and, of course, the European Union. So, NATO developed a policy of Partnership and Cooperation which over time developed political and military relations with almost all of the non-NATO countries is the Euro-Atlantic area, from Ireland to Uzbekistan. Partnership for Peace and the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council also put NATO's enlargement from 16 to 19 members, and next year to 26, into a broader co-operative context, so that the process would help overcome past divisions rather than create new ones.

From the outset, a vital element of NATO's post-Cold War strategy was the development of a special relationship between the Alliance and the new, democratic Russia. That special relationship began as a way to build mutual confidence and trust through dialogue, and was reflected in the creation of a Permanent Joint Council. But the relationship soon developed in a more practical way, primarily because of the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

In 1995, NATO deployed military forces beyond its borders for the first time, to help bring an end to the bloody civil war in Bosnia. The Alliance then organised its first-ever peacekeeping mission, IFOR, to help ensure that peace and stability would endure in this country .

This was a historic step for NATO. It was the result of a recognition that challenges beyond NATO territory could directly threaten the security of Alliance members. The NATO countries agreed that the only way to preserve their shared security was to go to the source of the problem.

But NATO was not alone in keeping the peace in Bosnia. Russia's contribution to this peacekeeping operation, alongside NATO, demonstrated to all that the Euro-Atlantic community was united in its determination to bring peace to the Balkans. It also demonstrated the potential of cooperation between Russia and the North Atlantic Alliance in bringing lasting solutions to threats to our common security. This was demonstrated once again in Kosovo, where, despite political differences during the conflict, NATO and Russian troops subsequently worked side by side to keep the peace. I am delighted that our men and women in uniform have performed admirably in their shared missions in the Balkans.

However, the most fundamental change in the relationship between NATO and Russia came as the result of the brutal terrorist attacks on September 11 th , 2001. In the face of new challenges, NATO again had to transform in order to respond effectively. And once again, the NATO-Russia relationship evolved in tandem.

For the first time in its history, NATO invoked Article 5 of the Washington Treaty indicating that this attack was an attack against all Allies, and then deployed forces to the United States (AWACS aircraft) and the Mediterranean as part of the war against terrorism.

Without hesitation, Russia, no stranger to the dangers of terrorism and al Qaida, stood with us, providing political and practical support. The civilized world understood, perhaps for the first time, that terrorism had mutated from a national problem of law enforcement into a threat to international security and stability. Subsequent attacks in the heart of Moscow underscored the shared nature of this threat.

Russia's principled decision to stand with NATO partners in the fight against Al-Qaida was welcome proof of the new solidarity in the Euro-Atlantic area. Russia's strong support in that fight demonstrated the practical benefits of such solidarity in responding to those attacks, and in helping to ensure our security in future.

But much more needed to be done. So, only 8 months after the attacks on New York and Washington, NATO and Russia took their cooperation to an unprecedented and qualitatively new level. At the Rome Summit in May 2002, twenty heads of state and government created a new NATO-Russia Council (NRC), where Russia would sit as one of twenty equal partners addressing common security threats. Focusing on the most critical issues facing both NATO and Russia terrorism, proliferation, crisis management, civil emergencies, defence reform, and a range of new threats the Twenty erased the dividing line that had defined their earlier relationship, and institutionalised the new spirit of cooperation between NATO and Russia.

NATO's Prague Summit, in November 2002, continued this trend. It demonstrated that NATO had indeed developed a comprehensive new approach to the security environment of the 21 st century. Prague set out a common commitment to deter, disrupt and defend against the threat of terrorism as a transatlantic community -- NATO Allies, together with Russia, other partners and other international organisations. The same common approach was taken toward weapons of mass destruction. Since Prague, the Alliance has been working with Russia and other partners to better protect our populations, our critical infrastructure and our forces against any use of biological, chemical, radiological and nuclear weapons. The NATO Russia Council Working Group on Non-Proliferation has been in the vanguard of this effort.

In a world of global terrorism and unpredictable dictators, NATO cannot wait for threats to appear on its doorstep. It is not a global policeman. But it must be able to defend against threats from wherever they might come.

As a result, NATO has taken on new missions. In mid-April, it agreed to assume the leadership of ISAF, the international peacekeeping mission in Afghanistan, by taking on the command, co-ordination and planning of the UN-mandated operation. A NATO lead in ISAF means that the international community no longer has to search for a lead nation every six months. And it enables NATO's hard-won experience in stabilising the Balkans can be used in dealing with today's equally demanding challenges.

NATO's new role in Afghanistan has been welcomed by all concerned, including the UN, the Afghan people and the Russian Government. It shows that the international community is determined to ensure that Afghanistan reaches its potential as a free, secure country that does not pose a threat to its neighbours or the wider international community. Indeed, Afghanistan has already become a matter for intensified dialogue between NATO and Russia, with regular Ambassadorial and Ministerial exchanges on the evolving security situation.

Shortly after the ISAF decision, NATO took yet another pragmatic step into the 21 st century by agreeing to provide planning and other support for Poland as it prepared to take command of a multinational division helping to bring stability to post conflict Iraq. There was of course disagreement about the decision to take military action in Iraq, even among allies. But there is no disagreement that it is in our common interest to bring stability and security to that country, and NATO is helping to achieve that shared goal.

Transformation means new military capabilities as well as new political relationships and new missions. These new missions require a different lead of military power, based not on the Cold War but on today's very different threats. Readers of Krasnaya Zvezda are, of course, familiar with the challenges of defence modernisation and transformation, as Russia faces many of these same challenges today . The NATO Russia Council has provided a forum for exchanging experience and developing practical cooperation in this area. We are working together on theatre missile defence and defence reform. The NATO-Russia Centre for "Information, Consultation and Training for the Resettlement of Military Personnel Discharged or Due For Discharge from the Russian Federation Armed Forces", based in Moscow, has also already proven its value.

Finally, of course, NATO is transforming by Enlarging. At Prague, NATO extended invitations to seven countries to join the Alliance. In the spring of next year, Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia will become NATO members. Some Russian commentators worry about the impact of Enlargement on Russian's security. They do not need to do so.

The new member countries will not dramatically enhance the overall military capability of the Alliance. Nor will there be a massive shift of NATO forces and infrastructure eastward. But Enlargement will help to consolidate democracy and stability in Europe.

The bottom line is that NATO enlargement is not directed against Russia or any other country. The political goal of the enlargement process, like that of the broader partnership agenda, is to help create a Europe whole, democratic and free. Next year, when the European Union also increases its membership, we will come a huge step closer to that goal. And the contributions made by these two enlargement processes to the development of peaceful, democratic societies throughout Central and Eastern Europe has helped to create good neighbours both for NATO members and for Russia.

Since May of last year, NATO Allies and Russia have been sitting as equals around the same table, working out common programmes of cooperation on key 21 st century security challenges. This is unprecedented cooperation, in depth, in breadth and in character. It is an essential pillar of a peaceful Euro-Atlantic area. It also has the potential to make a vital contribution to the international community's success in meeting global security challenges.

It used to be said: Better jaw-jaw than war-war. I would go further: to win our common war against terrorism, weapons of mass destruction and instability, NATO and Russia must go from jaw-jaw to concrete cooperative action. The good news is that we are already well on the road to doing so. Closer relations with Russia have become a central element of NATO's broad transformation agenda. For me, this has been one of the key achievements of my term as NATO Secretary General.