Commentary by NATO Secretary General Lord George Robertson First published in "Armed Forces Journal International", September 2000. Article can also be found on AFJ Publishing Group's website on 03-Apr-2001.

Transatlantic Teamwork By working together, NATO Allies can meet the New Challenges they face A little over a year ago, Operation Allied Force ended. This air campaign was unique in many respects: militarily, politically, legally. It was the most crucial test for this Alliance in its entire 50-year history. But NATO passed this test with flying colors. Allied Force achieved all its objectives. At the end of the day, Serb forces were out, KFOR was in, and the refugees were home. This is as good a definition of success as you can get. Today, the situation in Kosovo is much better than it was. For the first time in many years, Kosovar Albanians need not live in a constant state of fear. The state-sponsored crimes of hatred committed against Kosovar Albanians have been ended. Since KFOR deployed last year, 1.3 million refugees and displaced persons have returned to their homes, and 50,000 homes have been rebuilt. Last winter, no one had to be without shelter. More than 1,000 schools have been cleared of mines and unexploded ordnance. And, perhaps more significant for the long-term, multi-ethnic civilian organizations have been created to begin to govern Kosovo in the future. The success of Allied Force and of KFOR is a resounding vindication of the value of a strong transatlantic relationship. Together, North America and Europe achieved something none of them could have achieved alone: changing the course of Balkan history for the better, giving all of southeastern Europe the perspective for a brighter tomorrow. And it is not only the 19 NATO Allies who are engaged in this project: about two dozen Partner countries from all corners of the compass are part of the team as well, ready to make their contribution, and eager to associate themselves more closely with our Alliance. Bosnia and Kosovo demonstrate that the security interests of the US, Canada, and Europe remain linked. The end of the Cold War did not change that. What needs to change, however, are the ways in which these common interests are being pursued. The end of the Cold War, the emergence of new conflict scenarios, and the progress of European integration have changed the parameters of the transatlantic relationship. NATO must reflect these changes, if it is to remain relevant. In short, it needs to adapt. We have already come a long way in this adaptation. Last year, the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland joined NATO as new members. NATO has developed the Membership Action Plan (MAP) to help the nine aspirant countries to improve their credibility as future members. NATO-Russia relations are picking up momentum again after our Kosovo disagreements. Croatia has just joined the Partnership for Peace, bringing the number of Partners up to 26! NATO's Mediterranean Dialogue has just welcomed Algeria as another participant. And we have just inaugurated a Center for Weapons of Mass Destruction in order to develop a coherent Allied response to this challenge. This is an impressive list. It brings home NATO's role as a catalyst for change and a source of stability far beyond its borders. But the transformation of NATO is not complete. Kosovo, in particular, has provided us with a clear appreciation of the challenges that have yet to be addressed. These are formidable challenges, to be sure, but they must be met if the Alliance is to remain as effective in the 21st century as it was in the previous one. In my view, three challenges stand out. First, we must improve our military capabilities. NATO's credibility as a crisis manager rests on its military competence. To maintain that competence, we need effective forces–forces with precision-guided munitions, modern command and control systems, and high mobility. Furthermore, these capabilities must be shared across the Alliance, not just among a few advanced members. The Defence Capabilities Initiative (DCI) is the means we chose to address these shortfalls. Fifty-eight specific improvements of military capabilities were approved by NATO nations. Most of these have meanwhile been translated into even more specific Force Proposals. But let us be clear: improving NATO's military capabilities cannot be done on the cheap. Yes, we can achieve a lot by spending more wisely: reprioritization, efficiency savings, multi-national cooperation, or making greater use of civil assets. Still, the fact remains that more money will be needed in many cases. Our governments must know about the importance of these improvements. In particular, we need to remind our finance ministries of that. Second, there is the challenge of a European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI). For the Allies, Kosovo was a wake-up call. Not only did it bring home the stark military asymmetry between the US and the rest of the Allies, it also demonstrated the likely weakness of Europe as a strategic actor in those future cases where US leadership may not be available. That explains the rapid progress on developing a stronger European crisis-management capability since last year. The aim is ambitious: by 2003, the European Union (EU) wants to be able to deploy up to 60,000 troops within 60 days’ notice, and sustain them for at least one year. To provide the political and military leadership for such an EU-led operation, new EU bodies are being set up. And new ideas are on the table to streamline European development and procurement practices. NATO is supporting these developments, because a Europe that makes a more coherent contribution is in the North American as well as European security interest. Modalities for NATO-EU relations are currently being worked out between the two organizations. Participation by non-EU Allies in EU-led operations is being defined. In sum, the groundwork is being done to ensure that ESDI becomes a win-win situation: more options added to our transatlantic menu of crisis response; a stronger Europe; a fairer sharing of the transatlantic burden; and, at the end of the day, a stronger NATO. But, like DCI, ESDI will stand or fall on capabilities. I believe the EU and NATO have made real progress, very quickly, in making stronger European capabilities a reality. But the hardest nut to crack, once again, will be funding. In the real world, capability costs. If the resources are made available–and I have every confidence that this can be done–we will have a stronger Europe, a stronger NATO, and a healthier transatlantic relationship. And our ability to manage crises will improve dramatically. The third challenge also relates both to capabilities and to the transatlantic relationship. I am referring to the issue of defense industrial cooperation. The logic is clear: defense industrial cooperation is a key part of the evolution of Euro-Atlantic security. Simply put, our forces need the best equipment we can provide. The defense industry on which we rely needs to be as efficient and modern as possible, and competition is at the heart of an efficient industry. We need competition, but we must guard against monopoly as a result of successive competitions. The size of the market and the investment in R&D for new technologies argues for transatlantic cooperation. Transatlantic cooperation is clearly in the interests of both NATO and Europe. That’s why our governments must take courageous, imaginative decisions to make our procurement and R&D regimes more flexible. As part of this, we urgently need action on both sides of the Atlantic to reform the mechanisms by which transatlantic agreements are structured. Our aim should be to achieve a genuinely new pattern of reciprocal transatlantic armaments cooperation, and to achieve it as soon as possible. Governments on both sides of the Atlantic must do more to make sure that such cooperation can proceed in a dynamic fashion. In this regard, there are some encouraging signs, including, of course, the recent decisions taken by the US administration to simplify and improve the export-licensing process for defense trade, which is an important step towards improved transatlantic defense-industrial relations. This initiative, among the many others taking place here and in Europe, will go a long way toward ensuring that NATO's forces have at their disposal the most effective and the most affordable equipment–which, in turn, will help support both DCI and ESDI. DCI, ESDI, and sound defense-industrial cooperation are indeed three major challenges, but also three major opportunities. Meeting these challenges will have synergistic effects across the entire spectrum of Alliance activities. I have no doubt that we will succeed, because security is teamwork. And the transatlantic team has long proven its value in addressing such key challenges for our future.